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ABSTRACT 
The authority to raise and spend money is one of the most expansive and 
fundamental of all Congress’s enumerated powers, particularly when 
Congress chooses to impose conditions on those who wish to receive its cash.  
The consensus modern view of this “conditional spending” is that its 
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unfettered use threatens the diversity and accountability goals of “our 
federalism.”  As a result, nearly all commentators support either direct or 
indirect judge-made limits on conditional spending.  These claims, I argue, 
rest on a set of largely unexamined assumptions about the political 
motivations, budgetary situation, and other incentives of the state officials who 
must decide whether or not to accept federal offers. 
Thus, this Article attempts to begin a truly in-depth study of the political 
economy of state decisions to accept federal funds.  In particular, I focus on 
state officials’ own incentives to preserve diversity and accountability, albeit 
for self-interested reasons.  For example, I document and model the ways in 
which opportunities to impose hidden taxes, or to export taxes onto outsiders, 
may encourage officials to turn down federal grants that might diminish state 
autonomy.  I also examine closely the available empirical evidence on the 
actual fiscal situation of states, concluding there is no evidence states are in 
such dire financial straits that they are likely ever obliged to accept federal 
funds.  In sum, I argue that the current consensus is mistaken about the need 
for constraining conditional federal grants.  Thus, there is presently little 
evidence in favor of judicial intervention in freely chosen state decisions to 
accept grants. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although it is a familiar point that debates over the most appealing way to 
read a statute may turn largely on empirical questions,1 not all statutory debates 
have yet been subject to careful examination of the underlying empirics.  For 
example, the Supreme Court has held that conditions attached by Congress to 
federal grants offered to state or local governments should be interpreted 
strictly against Congress, even where the plaintiff suing to enforce the 
condition is a third party.2  I argue here that this position can be justified, if at 
all, only by a showing that there are defects in the bargaining process between 
Congress and its grantees, and that those defects threaten values the courts are 
charged with protecting.  Defenders of the Court’s approach have suggested 
that states bargain from a position of weakness, and that their representatives 
have strong incentives to ignore the federalism values protected by the 
Constitution.3  In this Article, I attempt to subject these assumptions to more 
rigorous scrutiny, arguing that officials in fact have their own self-serving 
incentives to preserve federalism values.  In addition, I survey recent empirical 
evidence suggesting that officials typically have access to the resources to 
pursue their goals contrary to Congress’s entreaties. 
Given the scale of so-called “conditional” federal spending, and its place in 
 
1 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 885, 889-90 (2003). 
2 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
3 See infra Part I.B. 
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our constitutional structure, these questions are urgent ones.4  A vast array of 
domestic programs depend, in one way or another, on the states’ willingness to 
accept both federal dollars and the terms and conditions that go with them.5  
The question, then, of how or whether the federal judiciary should police these 
grants is a correspondingly important one.6 
 
4 Of course, I am not the first to note the importance of spending legislation.  See, e.g., 
David Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (1994); Edward M. Gramlich, 
Alternative Federal Policies for Stimulating State and Local Expenditures: A Comparison of 
Their Effects, 21 NAT’L TAX J. 119, 119-20 (1968); Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money and 
State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 847-49 (1979); Thomas R. 
McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism’s Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. 
CT. REV. 85, 86; Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 
STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1105-06 (1987); Peter J. Smith, Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending 
Power, 110 YALE L.J. 1187, 1188 (2001). 
5 These programs include: the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 
1407(a)(1) (2006); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) 
(2006); No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 6311(a)(1) (2006); Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. § 1396c 
(2006); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006); Clean Air Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7420 (2006).  Lynn Baker and Mitchell Berman also observe the 
importance of conditional spending doctrine for the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2006), Congress’s 
latest effort to require states to take greater account of the free exercise claims of individuals 
than the Supreme Court is willing to afford.  Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting 
Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever 
Congress Could Provoke it to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 495-97 (2003) [hereinafter Baker & 
Berman, Getting Off the Dole]. 
 For some basic discussions of the origins and structures of cooperative federalism, see 
MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES 7-10 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966); WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, 
OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 10-11 (1964); Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block 
Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism: A Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain, 14 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 297, 300-24 (1996); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture 
for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 668-73 (2001). 
6 In addition to debates over conditional spending per se, there has also been a fair 
amount of discussion of the fiscal dimensions of state and federal relations in the context of 
a related problem: the so-called “unfunded mandate.”  This scholarship, for the most part, 
focuses on the possibility that Congress is obligated to provide funds to accompany any 
regulatory demands it imposes on state or local governments.  See Robert W. Adler, 
Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1231-54 
(1997); David A. Dana, The Case for Unfunded Environmental Mandates, 69 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 3-5 (1995); Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the “New 
(New) Federalism”: Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97, 103-11 
(1996); Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth 
Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 
1355, 1356 (1993).  But see Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May 
Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
1001, 1081-87 (1995); Julie A. Roin, Reconceptualizing Unfunded Mandates and Other 
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Arlington Central School District Board of 
Education v. Murphy offers an occasion to revisit the question of judicial 
oversight of conditional federal spending.7  Arlington held, in essence, that the 
word “costs” in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) did 
not include the cost incurred by prevailing plaintiff parents to hire experts as 
part of their litigation to secure a free and appropriate education for their 
child.8  By the time the dispute reached the Supreme Court, the best reading of 
the statute was somewhat unclear; there was both clear legislative history 
pointing one way and a series of judicial interpretations, decided between the 
enactment of the statute and 2006, pointing in the other direction.9 
The Arlington Court resolved its interpretive problem by reading the IDEA 
strictly against Congress, a technique sometimes called the “clear statement 
rule.”10  That rule, dating to the early 1980s but somewhat unevenly enforced 
since,11 holds that courts may enforce against states the conditions of a federal 
grant only if those conditions are stated “unambiguously” in the statute.12  As 
scholars have recognized, the rule serves as a sort of second-best constitutional 
constraint on federal expansion; rather than directly striking down strings 
attached to federal grants, the Court simply interprets them penuriously.13 
The clear statement rule seems to depend on an assumption that state 
decisions are not to be trusted.14  Rational actors would only accept offers they 
 
Regulations, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 351, 386 (1999).  This Article considers, in effect, the 
reciprocal question: how best should we interpret conditions Congress imposes when it in 
fact does fund its “mandates”? 
7
 Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006).  For other 
early commentary on the Arlington decision, see Ilya Somin, A False Dawn for Federalism: 
Clear Statement Rules After Gonzales v. Raich, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2005-
2006, at 113, 131-33 (Mark K. Moller ed., 2006) [hereinafter Somin, False Dawn]. 
8 Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2457. 
9 Id. at 2459-63. 
10 Id. at 2459, 2461. 
11 See Baker & Berman, Getting Off the Dole, supra note 5, at 465; Brian Galle, Getting 
Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking About Conditional 
Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 162-66 (2004) [hereinafter Galle, Getting 
Spending]; Smith, supra note 4, at 1189-90. 
12 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); Barnes v. Gorman, 
536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 465-67 (1991). 
13 See Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and 
Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1303-04 (2002); David 
Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional Analysis 
of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197, 
1242-46 (2004); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: 
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 624 (1992); 
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
2085, 2097, 2122-23 (2002). 
14 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 13, at 635; H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic 
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perceive as producing a net benefit for themselves (or perhaps their 
constituents).  If state officials were well-advised, and really cared about the 
structural constraints on federal power some see in the Constitution, then there 
would be no need for the clear statement rule.15  The officials would refuse to 
accept offers that, in the long run, would undermine their own autonomy, 
diminish the diversity that leads to good national policy-making, or otherwise 
undercut what we think of as the values of federalism.16  Or, they would at 
least decline such offers unless the benefits of cooperation would outweigh 
those costs.17 
Of course, public officials at any level are unlikely to be perfectly rational, 
or to represent perfectly the interests of their constituents.18  Instead, we have a 
world of second-bests.  Indeed, it is widely understood that the Constitution 
itself is designed as a tool for channeling the less-than-perfect impulses of 
public officials into routes that nonetheless lead to acceptable outcomes.19 
What is not widely understood, or to date much studied, is whether such 
second-best channels funnel state and local actors when they decide whether to 
accept federal funds.20  The Supreme Court has barely nodded at the 
possibility.21  The existing academic literature argues almost exclusively that 
 
Search for a Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 867, 911 (1999); 
John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1319 (1997). 
15 For a more detailed analysis on this point, see infra Part I.B. 
16 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why 
State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 862 
(1998) [hereinafter Hills, Cooperative Federalism]; Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box 
of Federalism: The Case for Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 
90 GEO. L.J. 461, 465 (2002) [hereinafter Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box]. 
17 See Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 16, at 874. 
18 See, e.g., John Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political 
Accountability, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 131, 137-38 
(Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999); Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent 
Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political 
Institutions, 33 J.L. & ECON. 103, 103-06, 128 (1990). 
19 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public 
Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1332-33 (1994); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-
Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 921-22 (2005); 
Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice 
Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 480-87 (1988). 
20 For an exception, see John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: 
A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 121 (2004) 
[hereinafter McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights] (arguing that state 
institutional structures in fact are insufficient to preserve federalism values).  I take issue 
with this point herein.[ES: Can you provide an infra cite to where this is?] 
21 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) (contending that “powerful 
incentives might lead both federal and state officials to view departures from the federal 
structure to be in their personal interests”). 
Comment [BDG1]: This would  be a 
tough infra cite to provide, since I view 
the entire article as the response to this 
point.   
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the public cannot expect state officials to act in ways that preserve federalism 
values.22  States, in these accounts, are strapped for cash on account of 
competition for mobile capital and federal siphoning of scarce tax dollars, or 
otherwise in need of some central-government resolution to their collective-
action dilemmas.23  State officials must grab whatever funds or other 
nationalized solutions are available in order to provide the services their 
constituents demand.24[ES: This sentence seems a little awkward.  I tried to 
change it, but am open to other suggestions.]  Since the costs that flow from 
these acceptances arise down the road, or are difficult for constituents to 
notice, the officials pay them little heed relative to the value of the offered 
dollars or services.25  As a result, voters later inappropriately blame state 
officials for decisions that Congress putatively imposed.26 
In other words, courts and scholars generally believe that state officials will 
not turn down federal grants on their own in order to preserve a diverse 
national market for legal rules.  Indeed, even scholars who generally are not 
sympathetic to arguments for judicial enforcement of federalism values appear 
to accept this claim.  These other scholars, most prominently Professor Tribe, 
support the clear statement rule.27  They argue that binding states by the terms 
 
22 See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
1911, 1933 (1995) [hereinafter Baker, Conditional Spending]; McCoy & Friedman, supra 
note 4, at 124; McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights, supra note 20, at 90; 
Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box, supra note 16, at 462-63, 484, 496; Somin, False Dawn, 
supra note 7, at 137; Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 958 
(1985); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1385-
92 (2001) [hereinafter Young, Two Cheers]. 
23 See Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 22, at 1936 (describing how there is “no 
competitor to the federal government” to whom states could turn for alternative revenue); 
McCoy & Friedman, supra note 4, at 86 (explaining how the federal tax burden has 
increased, making it harder to raise state revenue and increasing state reliance on federal 
funds); Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box, supra note 16, at 468 (describing the horizontal 
competition between states because dissatisfied residents can move to another state); 
Stewart, supra note 22, at 971 (explaining that states are subject to “nearly irresistible” 
internal pressures from taxpayers and external pressures from competing states to accept 
federal funds). 
24 Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 22, at 1936-39; McCoy & Friedman, supra 
note 4, at 86, 124; Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box, supra note 16, at 484; Stewart, supra 
note 22, at 971. 
25 See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 4, at 124; cf. McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs. 
States’ Rights, supra note 20, at 94-100 (arguing that because of “rational ignorance” among 
constituents, government officials undervalue costs of burdens associated with acceding to 
federal objectives). 
26 See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 4, at 125 (exemplifying the problem by the fact 
that voters perceive the minimum drinking age law to be imposed by state government); 
Stewart, supra note 22, at 958. 
27 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
64-65 (2005); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-25, at 479-81 (2d 
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of grant conditions arguably unclear at the time of acceptance will make it 
more difficult for voters to police offers and acceptances.  Further, granting 
final say over grant terms to courts is said to diminish states’ continuing 
political influence over those terms.  As I attempt to show, these claims assume 
defects in the process of state decisions.  The voter activism story presumes 
that officials imperfectly protect federalism concerns absent close monitoring 
by the public.  And, absent some story about procedural flaws in state decision-
making, it is hard to see how the state-political-influence account explains why 
states should in effect be forbidden to assume the risk that in the future they 
will enjoy diminished influence over federal law. 
My central argument here is that the available economic data belie, or at 
best do not support the claims that state officials will fail to preserve diversity, 
or that federal grants wrongly obscure official accountability.  As a result, I 
maintain that decisions applying the clear statement rule, as well as more direct 
limits on conditional spending, are hard to defend.  I examine the public 
finance literature on state and local fiscal health, and state and local official 
responses to grants from higher-level governments.  I find, among other 
significant information, that critics of unconstrained conditional spending seem 
to greatly underestimate the capacity of state and local governments to raise 
their own revenues.  In many cases the perceived political cost to officials of 
raising money locally will be less than the perceived cost of federal grant 
conditions, even if officials heavily discount those conditions.  In those 
situations, the officials will refuse the grant unless there is an increase in its 
perceived benefits.  In effect, state own-revenue capacity is an independent 
check on federal expansion by means of conditional spending.  Relatedly, 
critics overlook the indirect fiscal supports (and, therefore, indirect constraints 
on Congress’s power to utilize conditional spending) that flow to states 
through the federal tax system. 
If local revenues are to be the prime check against federal expansion, it is 
important to know whether those revenues are large enough to matter.  
Therefore, I also examine available data on state fiscal capacity – that is, the 
ability of the States to raise enough money to provide the services demanded 
by their citizens.  For a variety of reasons, direct measures of fiscal capacity 
are difficult or controversial.28  However, I examine one possible indirect 
measure, the existence of the “flypaper effect.”  The “flypaper effect” is the 
 
ed. 1988); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-28, at 1175-76 (3d ed. 
2000); Engdahl, supra note 4, at 71; William P. Marshall & Jason S. Cowart, State 
Immunity, Political Accountability, and Alden v. Maine, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 
1078-79 (2000); Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear 
Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 826, 833 (2005); Smith, supra note 4, at 
1203-04; Somin, False Dawn, supra note 7, at 115; Stewart, supra note 22, at 966-69; Cass 
R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 339 (2000); Young, Two 
Cheers, supra note 22, at 1354-55. 
28 See infra note 232. 
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economic term for grant-recipient expenditures exceeding what classic 
economic theory would predict to be the amount spent as a result of the grant – 
money “sticks where it hits” instead of being diverted back to tax cuts.29  This 
might be evidence of the inability of states to raise all the money they need to 
provide services, or at least an indication that federal revenue-raising is more 
efficient than state taxation.  However, after canvassing the existing literature, 
I find no real support for those explanations, although I acknowledge that they 
remain at least theoretical possibilities. 
In short, I do not expect to refute for certain the claims and implicit 
assumptions of the proponents of judge-made limits on federal conditional 
spending.  However, I do establish that no convincing evidence presently exists 
to demonstrate that the reasonably rational decisions of self-serving officials in 
fact undermine federalism.  As I explain, the burden is on proponents of 
judicial intervention to explain why judges should set aside the freely-made 
decisions of uncoerced public officials.  And so far I see no signs that such a 
burden can be met. 
Part I of this Article sets out the Arlington holding as well as the general 
judicial and academic dispute over the proper scope and interpretation of 
spending legislation.  Part I.B. elaborates on my claim that all of the arguments 
in favor of limiting spending legislation, including Professor Tribe’s defense of 
the clear statement rule, rely on an underlying assumption that state officials 
cannot be trusted to protect federalism values when deciding whether to accept 
a conditional grant.  Part II subjects this assumption to close examination, 
noting that existing accounts of state official behavior are incomplete in a 
number of respects, including their failure to consider the possibility that 
officials can replace costly federal grants with local taxes that at least appear 
less costly to their constituents.  Thus, Part III introduces a simple economic 
model of the substitutability of local taxes for federal grants.  Part IV suggests 
other theoretical reasons to believe official decisions to accept grants tend to 
preserve core federalism values.  Part V goes a step further, contrasting 
prevailing assumptions about voter confusion and state influence with the 
available empirical evidence.  Synthesizing a number of studies of state fiscal 
behavior, I show there is no evidence that state officials are in any meaningful 
sense constrained to accept federal grants. 
I. CONDITIONAL SPENDING: A BRIEF BACKGROUND 
When Congress distributes money to other persons or entities, it typically 
does so subject to conditions.30  This conditional spending is a major avenue 
 
29 James R. Hines, Jr. & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Autumn 1995, at 217, 218 (attributing the phrase to economist Arthur Okun). 
30 See Laura S. Jensen, Federalism, Individual Rights, and the Conditional Spending 
Conundrum, 33 POLITY 259, 277 (2000).  For an overview of the structure of conditional 
spending (albeit not an especially sympathetic one), see DAVID B. WALKER, TOWARD A 
FUNCTIONING FEDERALISM 144-51 (1981). 
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for federal regulation of state, local, and private actors.31  Congress’s authority 
to attach these conditions to its largesse is usually said to derive from Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution, commonly called the Spending Clause, which 
grants Congress “Power To lay and collect Taxes . . . to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare.”32 
For the most part, courts have not directly limited the scope of Congress’s 
power to enact legislation in the form of conditional spending.33  In the seminal 
case, South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court set out some loose restrictions 
on conditional grants but acknowledged they were largely aspirational.34 
The issue instead lies in how courts should interpret the terms of conditional 
grants.  In a series of decisions starting in 1981 with the Pennhurst case, the 
Supreme Court has declared it will not hold states to the conditions attached to 
a statute rooted in the Spending Clause unless those conditions are stated 
“unambiguously.”35 
The scope of this doctrine remains, after twenty-five years, still rather 
confused.36  The Court has not decided whether or not “unambiguous” 
conditions can be stated in regulations enacted in furtherance of a statute.37  It 
has given conflicting signals over whether courts should consider legislative 
history in determining the clarity of a statute.38  And, crucially, its decisions 
reveal an ongoing and unresolved tension in the underlying rationale for the 
Pennhurst rule.39 
 
31 See THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS 
99-115 (1990); DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD 
WASHINGTON 182, 189-91 (1995). 
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
33 See Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that 
“Kansas bears a very heavy burden in seeking to have the PRWORA declared 
unconstitutional” and discussing the lack of recent cases where conditions have been 
invalidated); Baker & Berman, Getting Off the Dole, supra note 5, at 466, 524; Smith, supra 
note 4, at 1196-97. 
34 United States v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); see Baker & Berman, Getting Off the 
Dole, supra note 5, at 466-69; Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending 
Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 32-33 (2003).  I have argued in 
an earlier work that this is a sensible conclusion.  Galle, Getting Spending, supra note 11, at 
229-30.  It is true that on its face the Spending Clause might allow Congress to enact 
legislation that would go beyond the limits on its other main sources of authority, such as 
the Commerce Clause.  But this fact is not troubling, given that Congress must literally pay 
a price, both in treasury dollars and political capital, for such expansions.  Id. at 169-70, 
187-91, 230.  Thus, some of Congress’s limits, as under the Commerce Clause, are textual, 
while others, as in the case of the Spending Clause, are structural or fiscal.  Id. at 170. 
35 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
36 See supra note 11. 
37 See Smith, supra note 4, at 1188-89. 
38 See Galle, Getting Spending, supra note 11, at 165. 
39 See id. at 162-66. 
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A. Understanding Arlington 
The Court’s decision in Arlington Central School District v. Murphy is 
typical in these regards.40  Arlington dealt with whether the word “costs” in the 
IDEA included the costs incurred by plaintiff parents for services rendered by 
experts.41  The structure of the IDEA is that Congress allocates money to state 
and local education agencies in exchange for those entities’ agreement to 
comply with the IDEA’s requirements.42  The IDEA’s primary requirement is 
that the agencies assure students with disabilities receive a “free [and] 
appropriate” education.43  Parents can challenge an alleged failure to comply 
with the IDEA, and, if they prevail, can recover their “costs,” such as 
attorney’s fees.44 
The holding of Arlington was that the word “costs” does not 
“unambiguously” include the costs of expert services rendered to prevailing 
plaintiffs.45  On its face, this determination was less strange than it seems at 
first.  There had been a series of earlier Supreme Court interpretations of the 
term “costs” in similar statutes, in each of which the Court found that “costs” 
was a term of art whose special statutory meaning was meant to exclude expert 
fees.46  On the other hand, in the case of the IDEA there was a Conference 
Committee Report – that is, a report by the committee of the House and Senate 
whose job it was to reconcile any differences between the two Houses’ 
versions of the bill – stating that the Committee understood “costs” to include 
expert fees in this context.47 
The Court resolved this conflict by invoking the Pennhurst rule.  The Court 
explained: 
“[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the 
nature of a contract,” and therefore, to be bound by “federally imposed 
conditions,” recipients of federal funds must accept them “voluntarily and 
knowingly.”  States cannot knowingly accept conditions of which they 
are “unaware” or which they are “unable to ascertain.”  Thus, in the 
present case, we must view the IDEA from the perspective of a state 
official who is engaged in the process of deciding whether the State 
 
40 Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006). 
41 See id. at 2457. 
42 See id. at 2458-59.  Congress appears not to have depended entirely on its spending 
power in enacting the IDEA, however.  See id. at 2464 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating 
that the IDEA was also enacted under the authority of Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
43 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2000). 
44 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2000). 
45 Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2463. 
46 See id. at 2461-63. 
47 H.R. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5 (1986) (Conf. Rep.).  For a more detailed discussion of 
how conference reports may be utilized in statutory interpretation, see ROBERT A. 
KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 46-68 (1997). 
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should accept IDEA funds and the obligations that go with those funds.  
We must ask whether such a state official would clearly understand that 
one of the obligations of the Act is the obligation to compensate 
prevailing parents for expert fees.  In other words, we must ask whether 
the IDEA furnishes clear notice regarding the liability at issue . . . .48 
The Court later added, “[i]n a Spending Clause case, the key is not what a 
majority of the Members of both Houses intend but what the States are clearly 
told regarding the conditions . . . .”49  Thus, the Court reasoned that since it 
was unclear whether the Conference Committee report could overcome other 
indications that “costs” did not include expert fees, Pennhurst meant the State 
had to prevail.50 
The puzzle here is that there is every reason to think that state officials in 
fact did clearly understand their obligations under the statute.  State 
representatives were intimately involved in the bargaining process that lead to 
the enactment of the “costs” provision.51  The IDEA would have been pointless 
if the states would not accept its terms, and accordingly state negotiators had a 
prominent place at the table during its drafting.52  Therefore, the states’ 
representatives were perhaps in a better position than the Court to understand 
the product of those negotiations.53  Indeed, the States lobbied against the 
 
48 Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2459 (citation omitted). 
49 Id. at 2463. 
50 Id. 
51 See Handicapped Children’s Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 1523 Before the 
Subcomm. on Select Education of the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong. 23-28 
(1985) (statements of National School Boards Association) [hereinafter NSBA House 
Statement]; id. at 10, 13, 17 (statement of Linus Wright, General Superintendent of Schools, 
Dallas, TX, representing the American Association of School Administrators); Handicapped 
Children’s Protection Act of 1985: Hearing on S. 415 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Handicapped of the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong. 61-79 (1985) 
(statement of National School Boards Association). 
52 Cf. NANCY LEE JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 
EDUCATION ACT: CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 5-6 (1995) (stating that the decision to structure 
the predecessor to the IDEA as a federal spending statute came in response to state advocate 
arguments that states could not themselves bear the costs). 
53 Cf. Robin Kundis Craig, The Stevens/Scalia Principle and Why It Matters: Statutory 
Conversations and a Cultural Critical Critique of the Strict Plain Meaning Approach, 79 
TUL. L. REV. 955, 967-70 (2005) (claiming that statutes may be intended for interpretation 
by an audience with already-developed understandings of the statute and its context that 
exceed the courts’ own understandings); Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the 
Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 
ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 511 (2005) (arguing that agencies may have superior information about 
the meaning of a statute because they were involved in its drafting, and therefore should be 
encouraged to use that information in the interpretive process); Peter L. Strauss, When the 
Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and 
the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 329-31 (1990) (discussing 
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inclusion of the expert fees language.54  Having failed to keep that language 
out, they nonetheless accepted Congress’s money.  At a minimum, when they 
began accepting money under the IDEA, New York officials had to know they 
did so at a substantial risk that they would have to pay expert fees.55  They 
certainly were not “unaware” of the condition or “unable to ascertain” it.  What 
they were unaware of was the exact likelihood that the condition would be 
upheld by a court. 
To put this point a different way, consider the claim that uncertainty about 
legal outcomes is indistinguishable from other forms of risk.  This is a 
common point in, for example, scholarship on the law of takings, and in 
debates about the proper transitional rules when laws change.56  A regulatory 
decision can wipe out a home’s value as surely as a hurricane.  When 
individuals make decisions about when to invest or enter into contracts, if 
rational, they will attempt to account for potential disasters both legal and 
natural.57  In a properly functioning market, these risks are capitalized into the 
value of property.58  Alternatively, the seller can insure the buyer against 
 
how agencies have particularized knowledge about legislative history because they are 
“almost wholly the creature[s] of [their] statutes”). 
54 See NSBA House Statement, supra note 51, at 25 (“[R]egarding the definition of fees 
and other expenses . . . we would prefer to see the committee adopt similar language to that 
used in other pieces of civil rights legislation, for instance, section 1988 . . . that says the 
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
55 See Galle, Getting Spending, supra note 11, at 176; cf. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 
773, 790-91 (1983) (holding that the conditional spending statute need not provide “notice” 
to the State of particular remedies that will be available against it under the statute).  The 
notice explanation is particularly puzzling in light of the fact that New York’s IDEA-tied 
funding was re-authorized annually by Congress.  So, regardless of whether the obligations 
of the statute were clear at the time the IDEA was enacted, they were overwhelmingly clear 
more than a decade later in 2000, when New York accepted its yearly appropriation and the 
Murphys prevailed in court.  See Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 86 F. Supp. 
2d 354, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (ordering Arlington School District to pay for the cost of 
private schooling for the Murphys’ child), aff’d, 297 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2002); Brief for 
Respondents at 30-34, Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 
(2006) (No. 05-18) (arguing that, through 2002, numerous court decisions and 
administrative and legislative documents had interpreted the IDEA to impose expert costs 
on losing government party).  For more extensive discussion of the notice argument, see 
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2008). 
56 For the early definitive work, see Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: 
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 
1165 (1967). 
57 See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 
522-27 (1986) (suggesting that private actors should recognize legal changes may affect 
their investments). 
58 Cf. Avishai Shachar, From Income to Consumption Tax: Criteria for Rules of 
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losses, such as by selling her a warranty.59  In that case, the purchase price is 
higher.  Therefore, buying risky property without insurance is simply a wager: 
the property comes at a bargain price, and, if the risk never materializes, the 
purchaser has won her bet.60 
The challenge for Arlington and its advocates lies in articulating why states 
should be denied the opportunity to make these kinds of bargain purchases.61  
Just as a property buyer might elect to forego buying a warranty, states may 
choose to accept a federal grant subject to the risk of legal change that will 
reduce the value of their bargain.62  In Kathleen Sullivan’s classic formulation, 
restraints of this kind convert the right not to accept an offer into a duty not to 
 
Transition, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1581, 1596 (1984).  That is, the value of property should 
increase or decrease to reflect the risk of gains or losses. 
59 See Kaplow, supra note 57, at 527-28. 
60 See Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 283, 294 (1981).  There is considerable nuance to this claim.  Barbara H. Fried, 
Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123, 129-31 & n.11 (2003). 
61 Cf. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (describing 
conditional grants as outcome of bargain between states and Congress); Craig Volden, 
Intergovernmental Grants: A Formal Model of Interrelated National and Subnational 
Political Decision, 37 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 209, 228 (2007) (describing bargaining 
between Congress and state governors over conditions of AFDC grants). 
 I assume here that it is reasonably evident that a state, unlike an individual, will be fully 
informed about the relevant legal context of its decision to accept an offer.  Cf. Craig, supra 
note 53, at 1011-12, 1038 (observing that statutes governing a technically sophisticated 
audience need not be read according only to plain language because the audience is already 
familiar with the policy nuance of potential meanings). 
62 Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and 
the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 346-47 (arguing that bargainers 
should be free to exchange constitutional privileges for other consideration). 
 For example, in the lawmaking process that spawned the Arlington litigation, the States 
and Congress apparently agreed to leave the wording of the statute somewhat ambiguous as 
to expert fees, but to include a clear directive about fees in the Conference Report.  See 
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2462 (2006) (claiming 
that the conference report, in its interpretation of the statute’s fee language, was attempting 
to “depart from ordinary meaning” (citing W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 
92 n.5 (1991))).  But see Brief for Respondents at 33-42, Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006) (No. 05-18) (arguing that there was strong reason 
to believe at the time of enactment that the language of the statute itself was not especially 
ambiguous, but rather that it was relatively clear to the authors that it included fees).  One 
plausible interpretation of this sequence of events is that Congress and the states in effect 
agreed to disagree, or at a minimum, to take the chance that courts would decide how best to 
read the language of the statute.  Yet Arlington rejects the very possibility of political 
agreements by the states to be governed by later interpretations, even where that seems to 
have been the intent of their negotiators.  That is, the Arlington Court is willing to enforce 
only “what the States are clearly told,” rather than what they are arguably or likely told.  
Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2463. 
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accept an offer.63  In effect, we have limited state sovereignty in the name of 
state sovereignty. 
Arlington therefore raises more questions than it answers.  We may think 
states should largely be free to arrange their own affairs free of judicial control.  
However, that seems untrue of state decisions to take risks about the meaning 
of federal grants.  What is there about state decisions to accept legal 
uncertainty that is different from, and more suspect than, state decisions to 
accept any other form of uncertainty? 
B. The Defective-Bargaining Theories of the Clear Statement Rule 
Arlington and Pennhurst, as we have just seen, beg the question why we 
should prohibit states from entering into bargains subject to some legal 
uncertainty.  The Supreme Court and commentators, however, have elsewhere 
offered four distinct, if related, justifications.  The four defenses draw on 
Kathleen Sullivan’s architecture for thinking about waivers of constitutional 
rights.  Professor Sullivan suggests that we can justify setting aside bargains 
for constitutionally-protected rights where there are failures in the political or 
bargaining process,64 where there are third-party effects,65 or where individual 
 
63 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1419-21, 
1486-87 (1989); see also Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 426 (1998). 
64 Sullivan, supra note 63, at 1480-83, 1495.  That, of course, is the classic account of the 
basic justification for judicial review formulated by John Hart Ely, among others.  See 
generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Bruce Ackerman, Beyond 
Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) (describing how judicial review defines 
“the ultimate limits imposed on pluralist bargaining by the American constitutional 
system”); Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 659 (1979) (adopting an “interpretivist” view of judicial review put forth by Ely and 
arguing that the judiciary supports a constitutional right to welfare through its review of 
statutes).  That is not to say that the theory is without its own problems.  See, e.g., Paul 
Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131, 134-37 (1981) (arguing against Ely’s 
view that “courts are more competent to engage in representation-reinforcing judicial 
review” as opposed to “fundamental values review”); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling 
Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1072-77 (1980) 
(questioning the ability to ascertain which groups are prejudiced, a point central to Ely’s 
argument that “governmental action that burdens groups effectively excluded from the 
political process is constitutionally suspect”). 
65 See Sullivan, supra note 63, at 1478-79, 1482, 1491.  For other claims that third-party 
effects may justify unsettling bargains over rights, see Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme 
Court, 1987 Term – Forward: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of 
Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26-28 (1988); Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the 
Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 
916, 920 (2006); John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of 
Constitutional Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 829-30 (2006); Tamar Frankel, 
What Default Rules Teach Us About Corporations; What Understanding Corporations 
Teaches Us About Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 703-13 (2006); Seth F. 
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free transfers collectively result in unacceptable distributive consequences.66  I 
argue that all four defenses of the clear statement rule rest primarily on the first 
and second of Sullivan’s scenarios.  Each assumes, either explicitly or 
implicitly, that state decisions to accept grants produce serious third-party 
harms that will not be taken into account by the bargaining parties because of 
imperfections in the way in which public officials represent the public interest. 
More specifically, defenders of the clear statement rule presume that state 
decisions to accept federal funds will fail to account for the nationwide harms 
to our system of federalism that putatively will flow from many such decisions.  
Some defenders also claim that, as a result of political process failures, state 
officials’ decisions will fail to reflect some harms internal to the state.  
Correcting for these externalities may justify judicial intervention. 
Before I detail these arguments in more depth, note first that in order to 
justify judicial intervention one would likely have to identify failures on both 
the “supply” and “demand” sides of the grant.  If federal officials perfectly 
represent the nation as a whole, they will never offer grants to states where 
those grants would reduce the national welfare.  In the absence of any 
externality, state officials’ decisions to accept the proffered grants, similarly, 
should always maximize the wellbeing of the nation’s citizens.67  If the 
political process on either side is functioning properly, then welfare-reducing 
grants will fail: either Congress will never offer them or states will never 
accept them. 
Thus, although the first set of defenders of the clear statement rule focus on 
Congress’s behavior in extending grants, these defenders in effect also 
presume a defect in state process.  The Supreme Court, following Professor 
Tribe, has said it wants to assure the rules governing state behavior are crafted 
in a place where the political safeguards of federalism can operate – that is, a 
venue open to state lobbying efforts.68  By limiting statutes affecting states to 
 
Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1293, 1378-93 (1984). 
66 See Sullivan, supra note 63, at 1496-99. 
67 See Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 16, at 862-63 (suggesting that states 
will readily accept federal grants where “Congress has made a correct estimate of the 
nonfederal governments’ opportunity costs of providing the requested services”); Somin, 
Closing the Pandora’s Box, supra note 16, at 465. 
68 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) (“[T]o give the state-displacing weight 
of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for 
lawmaking on which Garcia relied to protect states’ interests.”) (quoting LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-25, at 480 (2d ed. 1988))); see also Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) (describing how “the wisdom and the discretion of 
Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess 
at elections” are controls on Congress’s power over the States); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-28, at 1175-76 (3d ed. 2000).  Richard Stewart also 
offered a similar argument, roughly contemporaneous with Tribe’s account.  See Stewart, 
supra note 22, at 963.  For other, later commentators agreeing with this approach, see supra 
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their “clear” language, the Court suggests it will reduce the degree to which 
judges alone can bind the States.69  Even assuming this is an accurate 
description of the judicial process, it leaves unresolved the demand-side of our 
equation.  The states may well lack power to control all the terms of the grants 
offered to them.  But that does not explain whether one should expect the states 
to accept such grants where their nationwide or local expected value is 
negative.  In claiming that state control is the whole story, Professor Tribe and 
the Court have simply assumed the states would accept pernicious grants. 
There is a similar lacuna in the claims by a second group of scholars who 
have argued the clear statement rule can be justified because, historically, 
courts have inadequately defended federalism values, and Congress is unlikely 
to give full consideration to the virtues of state power.70  This “underenforced 
norm” critique, too, seems to assume that states will not fully vindicate their 
own rights. 
A third set of commentators, including some who have urged the 
underenforced norm view, have given more direct attention to the question of 
state officials’ behavior.  One version of this argument suggests that state 
officials may have incentives to set aside or discount the potential harms of 
federal grants in favor of their own political interests.71  The typical story here 
 
note 27. 
 The political safeguards theory has proven highly controversial.  For more extensive 
discussions on either side, see JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL 
POLITICAL PROCESS 175-84 (1980); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the 
Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 107-12 (2001); Baker & Berman, 
Getting Off the Dole, supra note 5, at 475-77; Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political 
Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 1113, 1121-27 (1997); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political 
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 278-87 (2000); McGinnis & Somin, 
Federalism vs. States’ Rights, supra note 20, at 103-04; Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. 
Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 
1459, 1483-89 (2001); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role 
of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. 
REV. 543, 559-60 (1954). 
69 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464. 
70 See supra note 13. 
71 See Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 22, at 1942, 1946 (hypothesizing that 
legislators may seek to “‘entice’ outlier states into amending or adopting some provision(s) 
of state constitutional or statutory law”); Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 16, at 
886-87 (stating that politicians may face different agency costs at the federal or state level 
based on the strength of constituents); McCoy & Friedman, supra note 4, at 124-25; 
McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights, supra note 20, at 118; Somin, Closing 
the Pandora’s Box, supra note 16, at 465-66 (explaining how state politicians may have 
incentives to “yield to the preferences of national political majorities”); Stewart, supra note 
22, at 958-59; see also Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated 
Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 797 (1995) 
(describing how state officials can politically act in a self-interested manner); Levinson, 
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is one of a political market failure, in which local officials distort the 
preferences of their constituencies.  The central claim is that officials will fully 
value the proffered cash grant while discounting in their calculus the cost of 
any attached conditions.72  The cash the official has brought home to her 
district is easy to measure and highly salient in the eyes of her voters, while the 
costs of the accompanying strings may be hard to measure and be buried in the 
budgets of many different local entities.73[ES: This sentence seems awkward.  I 
tried to improve on it, but maybe you can do better than I did.]  The official 
also might calculate that voters will have trouble associating these costs with 
her decision to accept the grant.74 
These critics could raise a similar criticism based on the possibility of time 
discounting, but thus far have not.  An official offered the chance to accept a 
grant today may well discount the true effect of future costs.75  Grants allow 
for immediate political rewards, but costs may not come until much later.76  
The official may irrationally discount future costs, or rationally calculate that 
by the time angry voters notice the red ink, she will be safely retired or her 
vote long forgotten.77  At a minimum, the official has achieved some of her 
 
supra note 19, at 941 (asserting that state officials may favor increased federal power if it 
leads to more federal spending on states). 
72 See Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 16, at 886-87.  Professors McGinnis 
and Somin also emphasize that the states discount the costs to themselves of the federal tax 
dollars that pay for the grants they receive.  See McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs. States’ 
Rights, supra note 20, at 118 (explaining the incentive for politicians to “acquire funds that 
are mostly paid for by taxpayers in other states”).  While I disagree with this account, for 
my purposes here I accept it.  In my analysis I assume that states treat the costs to 
themselves of federal grants as essentially $0. 
73 See Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 22, at 1942-46 (discussing public choice 
dynamics of grants); cf. Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 16, at 886-88 (describing 
how Congress may require public participation in accepting federal grants because of the 
view that “some constituents are over or underrepresented in the local political process”). 
74 See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 4, at 124 (stating that voters tend to view grants as 
gifts without considering the attached strings); Young, Two Cheers, supra note 22, at 1360-
61 (describing how in a nontransparent political system “people cannot assign blame for an 
unpopular federal policy”); cf. McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights, supra 
note 20, at 94-99 (describing sources of rational voter ignorance of federalism issues). 
75 Cf. Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, Toward an Agenda for Behavioral Public 
Finance, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 12-13 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod 
eds., 2006) (describing the effect on public officials of “present-tense bias”). 
76 Cf. Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 
31 (1982) (suggesting that political “issues of immediate impact” will predominate over 
issues “carr[ying] a long-term impact”). 
77 See Daniel A. Farber, From Here to Eternity: Environmental Law and Future 
Generations, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 289, 294-301; Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, 
Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1039-41 (1990); Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 
265-66 (1979). 
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policy goals in the time between the reward of the grant and the pain of the 
costs.78  Even if the official genuinely wants to balance costs and benefits, 
many costs can be purely subjective, making them difficult for the official 
alone to measure.79 
Finally, there is a fourth strand of support for the clear statement rule that 
seems to focus on both the supply and demand sides of the grant process.  In 
this view, which I have elsewhere termed “notice as deliberation,”80 the clear 
statement rule activates citizens who otherwise would be inattentive to the 
legislative process.81  The notice-as-deliberation approach, like the 
underenforced norms critique, begins with a public choice story about general 
voter inattention.  The theory here appears to be that, if not for the vagueness 
of the terms attached to conditional federal grants, voters would be more 
engaged in both federal and state legislative processes.82  That engagement, in 
turn, would make it more likely that offers and acceptances alike would 
enhance national welfare, rather than heeding small groups of special interests. 
In sum, all of the defenses of the clear statement rule depend on a common 
premise, sometimes explicit and sometimes assumed, of failures in the state 
political process.  More specifically, they rely on the likelihood that, when 
state officials elect to accept federal grants, they will discount to some degree 
potential harms to their constituents or outsiders that arise from their decisions 
to accept the grant.  As I will argue, because states are usually free to make bad 
policy for themselves, it is this latter externality – harms to outsiders – that is 
of greatest concern to constitutional law.  Meanwhile, the question remains the 
broader one: do state officials maximize national welfare in their decisions to 
accept funds? 
Thus, the remainder of this Article attempts to shed more light on the 
behavior of state officials.  Despite the centrality of this question, scholars 
have subjected it to little, if any, rigorous scrutiny.  In the succeeding Parts, I 
attempt to assemble the available social science evidence on whether voters 
can rely upon state officials to preserve the values of federalism. 
II. DISCOUNTING, PUBLIC CHOICE, AND THE THEORY OF GRANTS 
As Part I demonstrated, the question of how judges should interpret the 
 
78 See Brian Galle, Designing Interstate Institutions: The Example of the Streamlined 
Sales and Use Tax Agreement (“SSUTA”), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1381, 1425 n.224 (2007) 
[hereinafter Galle, SSUTA]. 
79 See Aranson et al., supra note 76, at 38-39. 
80 Galle, Getting Spending, supra note 11, at 177-81. 
81 Merrill, supra note 27, at 833; see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How 
Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 16-39 
(2007) (making this argument in the context of congressional decisions to preempt state 
law); Sunstein, supra note 27, at 317, 335 (making this argument in the context of 
delegations to agencies that would approach limits of federal power over states). 
82 See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 317. 
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terms of federal grants turns on underlying questions about the performance of 
state officials.  If state officials internalize whatever social cost may 
accompany a decision to accept a federal grant, the case for close judicial 
oversight weakens.83  This Part begins the analysis at the level of the general 
theory of official behavior in response to grants.  Is it true, as proponents of the 
clear statement rule suggest, that state officials largely discount any negative 
effects of the grants?  The analysis that critics of conditional spending offer for 
the political economy of state decisions to accept funds remains significantly 
incomplete.  Indeed, given the wide variety of different combinations of grants 
and conditions, any broad generalizations about the politics behind them 
probably cannot prove accurate in all cases. 
A. Public Choice Theory 
The critical analysis, as outlined in the last section, relies mainly on 
straightforward public choice theory.84  The small, heavily affected group, the 
argument goes, will be the potential recipients of federal grants, while the costs 
of complying with the federal strings will be buried in the state’s budget and 
spread thinly among all taxpayers.85  Even if no grantees have organized at the 
time of an initial grant offer, over time, a constituency might develop that 
depends on the grant revenues and form a powerful lobbying coalition to retain 
them.86  That scenario plausibly describes some federal programs, such as the 
 
83 For purposes of this Part, I accept, for the sake of argument, the possibility that 
externalities of any kind might justify federal judicial intervention.  In later Parts, I will 
argue that courts should be concerned only with certain kinds of third-party effects – that is, 
that state officials should be free to make bad decisions, except to the extent that their 
decisions infringe on federally-protected values.[ES: Can you add an infra cite here?] 
84 Rationally self-serving public officials, this claim goes, will tend to favor the interests 
of their most intensely motivated group of constituents (or other interests involved in the 
legislative process).  See McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights, supra note 20, 
at 103, 118.  The effect is the result of collective action problems among constituents, many 
of whom would prefer to free ride on the work of similarly situated others.  Thus, the most 
intensely active groups will be those that are small and have much at stake in the legislation.  
For some basic summaries of public choice theory, see MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 11-16, 21-22, 31, 35, 46-
48 (1965); TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 19-62 (1992) 
(outlining several economic tools that aid in the study of collective action problems). 
85 Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 16, at 887 (arguing that well-organized 
opposition could stop a cost-effective initiative that would benefit people with “muted 
voices”); Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box, supra note 16, at 465-66; Stewart, supra note 
22, at 958. 
86 See Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box, supra note 16, at 499; see also STEPHEN J. 
BAILEY, LOCAL GOVERNMENT ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 97 (1999); cf. 
Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of 
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 278-
79 (1990) (explaining how interest groups develop stakes in the legal status quo by favoring 
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IDEA, which offer specific entitlements to discretely identified groups (e.g., a 
free and appropriate public education for children with disabilities), while 
distributing the cost of the entitlement broadly across a wide swath of state 
budget lines.87  As a result, this theory predicts that state officials will accept 
federal grants too readily, undercutting structural constitutional protections for 
a diverse set of legal regimes.88 
However, one can just as easily think of any number of examples in which a 
superficial public choice analysis cuts in the opposite direction.  To return to 
the IDEA example, the bureaucracy of each state agency is itself a 
constituency of the legislature, and will likely resist threats to its budget – 
indeed, that is the point of public choice theory.89  Thus, efforts to tap other 
state budget items in order to pay for grant-compliance costs may stir up very 
active resistance both from the ultimate beneficiaries of those budget items as 
well as the government actors who administer them.90  The critics’ IDEA story 
remains plausible where the resulting budgetary burden is spread evenly across 
the entire state budget.  In that scenario, the impact on the recipients of each 
other state budget line may be small enough, and the number of the affected 
large enough, that collective action problems will tend to mitigate political 
opposition.  In actuality, however, state-level IDEA expenses typically fall 
rather heavily on a few budgets such as Departments of Education and other 
state-level service providers obliged to provide services (such as transportation 
for individuals with disabilities or residential care for the mentally ill) free of 
charge.91  Thus, a decision to accept a grant subject to the IDEA’s restrictions 
may well prompt a strong response from the affected agencies, as few others 
will produce lobbying efforts upon which each agency could free ride. 
Many other federal grant regimes look even less like the public choice 
backdrop painted by critics.  For instance, until 1975, Congress required states 
to enact laws obliging motorcyclists to wear helmets as a condition of federal 
highway funding.92  Beginning in the early 1970’s, however, a coalition of 
 
the jurisdiction in which they are expert). 
87 For example, the IDEA appears to require contributions not only from state education 
departments but also from other agencies that might provide services to the disabled 
students.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(12)(B) (2006). 
88 Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 22, at 1950; Hills, Cooperative Federalism, 
supra note 16, at 887; Stewart, supra note 22, at 958, 971; see also Dorf & Sabel, supra 
note 63, at 430-31 (arguing that conditional spending, like commandeering, essentially 
obliges states to accept funds and attached conditions). 
89 See Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 16, at 887 (recognizing that “nonfederal 
officials are themselves a powerful interest group with interests that can be inconsistent with 
the well-being of their constituents”). 
90 Theory predicts that bureaucrats should prove highly effective in influencing 
legislative decisions.  See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 739, 769 (1984). 
91 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(12)(B) (2000). 
92 Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-564, 80 Stat. 731 (1966); 23 C.F.R. § 
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cyclists and motorcycle manufacturers banded together to undermine the 
laws.93  Although the cyclists did not succeed in convincing any state to refuse 
federal funding, they went one better: they prodded many state officials into 
joining their federal lobbying efforts, resulting in the ultimate repeal of the 
helmet restriction.94  Medical costs rose sharply afterwards and fell largely on 
the general public.95  This was the opposite of the story told by critics of 
conditional spending.  Here, a small, concentrated group shifted costs to the 
public at large by resisting a conditional grant. 
If that example proves unconvincing, consider the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).96  
States accept funds subject to CAA conditions despite the large, concentrated 
costs that the polluters in their jurisdiction bear as a result.97  Of course, 
scholars sometimes hold up the environmental movement as a rare example of 
public interest in small, diffuse costs occasionally triumphing over the 
concentrated interests of polluters.98  That triumph, though, only further 
emphasizes the difficulty of forecasting matters of political economy. 
B. Things Get Sticky: Grant Theory 
With that caution, again, about the dangers of generalization, there is also an 
argument that under classic public finance theory almost every non-matching 
conditional grant scenario should raise no public choice concerns.  Because 
money is fungible, even an earmarked federal grant should do no more than 
slightly reduce the price for all of a state’s expenditures, in effect re-
 
204.4 (1969). 
93 See Clay P. Graham, Helmetless Motorcyclists – Easy Riders Facing Hard Facts: The 
Rise of the “Motorcycle Helmet Defense,” 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 233, 238 (1980). 
94 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-280, § 208(a), 90 Stat. 454 (1976) 
(codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 402(c) (2000)); U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L 
HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMIN., A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EFFECT OF MOTORCYCLE 
HELMET USE LAW REPEAL – A CASE FOR HELMET USE (1980); Graham, supra note 93, at 
238. 
95 See Andreas Muller, Evaluation of the Costs and Benefits of Motorcycle Helmet Laws, 
70 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 586, 586 (1980). 
96 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006). 
97 Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 597-98 
(1996) (explaining that states accept environmental regulation despite concentrated costs to 
particular industries and intangible benefits); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? 
Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental 
Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1213 (1977) (explaining the improved position of 
environmentalist groups when the federal government, rather than the states, sets policy). 
98 See Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of 
the Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 94-99, 110-12 (2001); Richard L. 
Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 553, 564-65 (2001); Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican 
Moment – Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-73, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 
29, 50-59 (1998). 
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distributing the grant evenly to every beneficiary of state spending.99  For 
example, suppose a state chooses to spend $100 million of its $1 billion budget 
on highways.  The federal government gives the state $50 million earmarked 
for highway spending.  The state still prefers to tax its citizens and allocate its 
resources in such a way that it spends $100 million on roads.100  The effect 
should be that the state reduces its own spending on highways by $50 million 
and either cuts taxes by $50 million, distributes the $50 million proportionately 
among all its other spending priorities, or, more likely, a mix of the two.101  If 
this theory accurately represented how state governments behaved, then nearly 
all non-matching102 conditional federal grants would have thin, widely-spread 
benefits, but many of them would have narrow, heavy costs.  Public choice 
analysis predicts that in those situations states will simply refuse welfare-
diminishing grants because there is no disproportionately strong lobbying 
group pressing for acceptance of the grant. 
The catch here is that most empirical studies show that state and local 
jurisdictions do not behave this way, at least not to the extent that the classic 
theory predicts.103  Instead, targeted grants often increase recipient-jurisdiction 
 
99 David F. Bradford & Wallace E. Oates, The Analysis of Revenue Sharing in a New 
Approach to Collective Fiscal Decisions, 85 Q.J. ECON. 416, 420-23, 434 (1971) 
(explaining how a lump sum distributed to a group may have diffuse economic benefit to all 
individuals through revenue sharing); David F. Bradford & Wallace E. Oates, Towards a 
Predictive Theory of Intergovernmental Grants, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 440, 443 (1971) 
(suggesting that given certain conditions, a system that gave grants to individuals could 
“lead[] via the political process to precisely the same equilibrium state of the community as 
does the grant to the collectivity”); Ronald C. Fisher, Income and Grant Effects on Local 
Expenditure: The Flypaper Effect and Other Difficulties, 12 J. URB. ECON. 324, 325-26 
(1982).  That is, the grant shifts the state’s demand curve for government services outward 
without changing its shape. 
100 See Hines & Thaler, supra note 29, at 218.  To be completely accurate, the state 
would likely make a small upward adjustment in highway spending as a result of the 
additional wealth represented by the grant.  But one would expect this additional spending 
to be a fraction of the grant that resembles the percentage of the state’s overall wealth 
devoted to highway spending prior to the grant.  If citizens spent $.01 per dollar of income 
on highways, and the grant does not alter their preferences, they should spend $.01 of each 
grant dollar on highways. 
101 Fisher, supra note 99, at 328; see Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 
37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120, 1129 (1999). 
102 This analysis does not work perfectly for matching grants, which for obvious reasons 
tend to encourage the state to spend more than it would otherwise prefer on the matched 
expenditure.  ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 116-19 (2000); Stephen J. 
Bailey & Stephen Connolly, The Flypaper Effect: Identifying Areas for Further Research, 
95 PUB. CHOICE 335, 336 (1998) (“[O]pen-ended matching grants have a greater stimulatory 
effect on grantee spending than equivalent lump-sum grants because they have both income 
and substitution effects.”). 
103 See Katherine Baicker, Government Decision-Making and the Incidence of Federal 
Mandates, 82 J. PUB. ECON. 147, 177-78 (2001); Rebecca J. Campbell, Leviathan and Fiscal 
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spending in the targeted category, sometimes by nearly as much as the grant 
amount.104  For instance, in the highway example, the state might spend $130 
million on roads after receiving the $50 million grant, and cut taxes or increase 
other spending by only $20 million.  Economists call this the “flypaper effect,” 
because, as one economist colorfully put it, the money “sticks where it hits.”105  
Importantly, recent studies suggest that flypaper effects tend to be short-lived, 
such that grants increase targeted spending for a year or two, but states then 
begin to decrease their own contribution and offset the grant with tax cuts and 
spending increases in other areas, as theory predicts.106  Economists have 
offered a variety of possible explanations for the flypaper phenomenon, but no 
single theory has won out, and it seems possible that all of the hypothesized 
processes contribute in some measure to the observed results.107 
The underlying causes of the flypaper effect may well be significant to the 
public choice analysis.  Some of the theories tend to support the conclusion 
that state officials would undervalue the costs of accepting a grant or, 
equivalently, overvalue the benefit of accepting.  For example, one common 
account claims that the flypaper effect results from officials’ manipulation of 
state spending in order to develop constituencies favorable to them, or from 
 
Illusion in Local Government Overlapping Jurisdictions, 120 PUB. CHOICE 301, 324 (2004); 
Radu Filimon et al., Asymmetric Information and Agenda Control: The Bases of Monopoly 
Power in Public Spending, 17 J. PUB. ECON. 51, 60-61 (1982); Nora Gordon, Do Federal 
Grants Boost School Spending? Evidence from Title I, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1771, 1773 (2004); 
Peter M. Mitias & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Grant Illusion, Tax Illusion, and Local 
Government Spending, 29 PUB. FIN. REV. 347, 361 (2001); Geoffrey K. Turnbull, The 
Overspending and Flypaper Effects of Fiscal Illusion: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 44 J. 
URB. ECON. 1, 15-232 (1998); Byron F. Lutz, Taxation with Representation: 
Intergovernmental Grants in a Plebiscite Democracy 24 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, 
Working Paper No. 2006-06, 2006), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs 
/FEDS/2006/200606/200606pap.pdf.  But see Brian Knight, Endogenous Federal Grants 
and Crowd-out of State Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the Federal 
Highway Aid Program, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 71, 88 (2002) (“[F]ederal highway grants crowd 
out state highway spending, leading to little or no increase in net spending.”). 
104 Bailey & Connolly, supra note 102, at 337-38, 339 tbl.1; G. Brennan & J.J. Pincus, A 
Minimalist Model of Federal Grants and Flypaper Effects, 61 J. PUB. ECON. 229, 230 
(1996); Fisher, supra note 99, at 329-30 & tbl.1; Hines & Thaler, supra note 29, at 219-20; 
Oates, supra note 101, at 1129; Monica Singhal, Special Interest Groups and the Allocation 
of Public Funds, 92 J. Pub. Econ. 548, 554-56 (2008) (finding increases in state 
expenditures on tobacco control programs despite large tobacco industry lobby); Volden, 
supra note 61, at 225. 
105 See supra note 29. 
106 Gordon, supra note 103, at 1785-88; Lutz, supra note 103, at 19. 
107 See Sang-Seok Bae & Richard C. Feiock, The Flypaper Effect Revisited: 
Intergovernmental Grants and Local Governance, 27 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 577, 583-85 
(2004); Bailey & Connolly, supra note 102, at 336, 347; Fisher, supra note 99, at 324; 
Hines & Thaler, supra note 29, at 220-22. 
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whom they can extract rents.108  That is, officials take what would be an even 
distribution of benefits and make it lumpy, precisely in order to generate extra 
engagement from the community benefited.  In that scenario, one might 
plausibly predict that the relevant officials see more political value in creating 
a beholden set of grant recipients than the value of the grant warrants.  Thus, 
although the officials do not underestimate costs of compliance, they may 
overvalue the gains of the grant.  This prediction assumes, however, that the 
officials with authority to accept conditional grants also have the authority to 
allocate the resulting funds, or at least that they have a large degree of 
influence over the allocating officials.  That is not necessarily a good 
assumption, particularly if budget-setting authority rests mainly with the 
executive and acceptance rests with the legislature or vice versa.109 
A number of other theories of the flypaper effect might suggest little or no 
additional political pressure to accept federal grants.  One might, for instance, 
question whether the rent-extraction theory can be squared with the categorical 
stickiness of grants – that is, the fact that grant dollars are spent on the activity 
they target.  If politicians are developing or catering to interest groups, why do 
politicians in many different states and local jurisdictions all happen to cater to 
the same interest groups as those targeted by the federal grant?  One 
economist, Monica Singhal, theorizes instead that the flypaper effect is a form 
of commission payment to groups that generated extra money for the state 
through successful lobbying at the federal level.110  In order to motivate these 
groups to continue to exert effort in the future, state officials must offer them 
some reward.111  However, the group receives only a fraction of the value of 
the grant, and the state offsets later payments as theory predicts.  Although 
Singhal does not consider our particular question, under this view, no evident 
reason exists for state officials to either overvalue grant awards or undervalue 
the cost of grant conditions. 
In short, absent some new resolution of these disputes, it is unclear what 
results public choice theory should predict for state decisions to accept 
grants.112  Grants from higher to lower tiers of government may or may not 
 
108 See Bae & Feiock, supra note 107, at 581; Filimon et al., supra note 103, at 52. 
109 Cf. Bae & Feiock, supra note 107, at 584-85, 591 (arguing that the flypaper effect 
may depend on the degree of accepters’ control over the budget and finding a larger effect 
where control of the budget and acceptance of the grant is integrated). 
110 Singhal, supra note 104, at 549. 
111 Id. at 551. 
112 Later in this Article, I argue that the best explanation for the observed flypaper data is 
a combination of official responses to incomplete voter understanding of fiscal information, 
together with the need to appease grantors.  See infra text accompanying notes 245-255.  
This result, even if right, remains ambiguous as to the likely political economy results.  
Officials who respond to voter ignorance may be acting either self-interestedly or in the 
public welfare.  Only the first set may reduce overall welfare by their choices, and available 
data to date do not allow us to distinguish between the two. 
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result in widely shared benefits, confounding our ability to predict how 
political actors will respond. 
C. Discounting “Good” Grants 
A final point of uncertainty about the public choice critique of federal grants 
is that some grants may enhance national welfare.  For example, grants and 
their accompanying conditions may operate as tools of interstate coordination, 
through which the federal government can encourage states to reduce negative 
spillovers or increase their production of goods with positive externalities.113 
Just as local officials may neglect the negative nationwide effects of 
accepting a grant, so too might they ignore the positive nationwide effects.  By 
definition, local voters do not take externalities into account in their 
preferences.114  Moreover, if the public choice/discounting story proves 
persuasive, it should also persuade us about “good” grants.  The increased 
national welfare that follows from more efficient local behavior will benefit all 
citizens roughly equally and will arise mostly at some future time.  Again, the 
public choice story predicts that the political process will generally neglect 
these forms of goods.115 
Thus, the discounting of both nationwide costs and benefits may put grants 
in a kind of equipoise.  The fact that grants might be too tempting, in some 
sense, potentially can offset the fact that in another sense they are not tempting 
enough.116  Which effect predominates remains an empirical question that will 
vary from grant to grant.117 
Accordingly, I am skeptical that public choice analysis offers any coherent 
set of guidelines on which to base judicial intervention.  Even instances in 
which federal funds appear to flow narrowly and deeply to one interest group, 
 
113 Caminker, supra note 6, at 1012-13 (using the Radioactive Waste Act as an example 
to discuss ways in which Congress can empower the states); Oates, supra note 101, at 1127; 
Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 113 (2004).  
That is, rather than designing their own institutions for bargaining, writing their own sets of 
rules for agenda setting and agreement, and consenting to a mutually satisfactory 
enforcement system, states wishing to agree amongst themselves simply take their issues to 
their congressmen.  They can then write a proposed bill offering money in exchange for 
compliance and rely on federal regulators and courts to oversee the whole exchange.  See 
Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Introduction to ECONOMICS OF FEDERALISM, at 
viv-xv (Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein eds., 2007); Somin, Closing the Pandora’s 
Box, supra note 16, at 469-70. 
114 JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 120-28 (2d ed. 2007). 
115 See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 767-68 
(2004). 
116 I am grateful to Rick Hills for suggesting a version of this point. 
117 For purposes of this Article, though, I place relatively little weight on this possibility.  
My focus here is on whether state officials, on their own, will reject welfare-diminishing 
grants.  I therefore presume, for the sake of argument, that essentially all federal grants are 
at best welfare-neutral. 
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with costs spread thinly across a state’s population, may prove relatively 
innocuous on close inspection.  Our political science simply is not good 
enough to say for certain.118 
III. A SIMPLE MODEL OF TAX AS A CONSTRAINT ON DECISIONS TO ACCEPT 
GRANTS 
This Article has argued so far that the theoretical argument supporting the 
assumption that state officials will discount the costs of grants remains 
incomplete to the extent that it overlooks the possible implications of public 
finance economists’ theory of grants.  Another major hole in the critics’ 
assumptions lies in the fact that they neglect not only a complete treatment of 
grants but also any treatment of state and local taxation.  To illustrate the size 
of that hole, I offer a simple model of how local taxes could affect the 
attractiveness of federal grants to local officials.  In essence, one cannot make 
meaningful predictions about the political economy of a local decision to 
accept a grant by considering only the grant; a full analysis must include the 
politics of the state’s tax system as well. 
The model proceeds from the intuition that officials will choose the least 
politically costly alternative for obtaining a set benefit.  Even if officials 
discount the actual welfare cost to their constituents in determining whether to 
accept grants, grants still have political costs.  Depending on the degree of 
discounting, it may prove politically cheaper for the official to substitute a 
local tax increase for the federal grant.  Put another way, officials should only 
accept a conditional grant where the attached conditions are less odious than a 
comparable tax increase would be.  Thus, local political taste for increased 
taxes may represent a kind of floor for the amount of perceived costs a locality 
is willing to accept in exchange for federal funds. 
A series of stylized graphs illustrate this point.119  Figures 1A and 1B chart 
the politician’s perceived political cost of raising money, X, against Y, the 
actual cost of accepting a federal grant (in Fig. 1A) or raising taxes (in Fig. 
1B). 
 
 
118 Cf. Merrill, supra note 27, at 834 (arguing that the efficacy of political safeguards of 
federalism is an elusive, empirical question). 
119 For a more mathematically rigorous model based on a similar premise, see Volden, 
supra note 61, at 215-23. 
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These figures represent the ideal case: both of these graphs show identical 
straight lines, indicating that the politician fully internalizes the welfare effects 
either of an unfortunate condition (Fig. 1A) or imposing taxes (Fig. 1B).  In 
other words, in both Figures 1A and 1B the politician is just as reluctant to 
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force his constituents to suffer $100 in costs as the constituents would be 
themselves.120  In the world represented by Figure 1A, all decisions to accept 
grants will increase constituent welfare, because the politician will obviously 
reject grant offers in amounts below the line and accept those above it.  For 
instance, at point P1, where the actual and perceived costs of a condition are 
both $100, a grant amount would have to be $101 or more to convince the 
politician to accept.121  Tax is not a meaningful limit in Figure 1, since the 
political costs either of taxing a certain amount or accepting a condition with a 
given cost are always identical.  Thus, at point P1, any offer that exceeds the 
costs of accepting the grant condition could be matched only by a tax in which 
the political cost of raising $101 will exceed the cost of accepting the grant. 
There is a similar situation if, as critics of conditional spending seem largely 
to assume, politicians discount the costs of accepting grants but not the costs of 
raising taxes.122  Figures 2A and 2B model these assumptions. 
[ES: We should introduce figures 2A & 2B here.  Can you add a sentence 
doing this?] 
 
120 My results here do not depend on whether we conceive of costs to voters as average 
costs, costs to the median voter, or overall social welfare adjusted by some distributional 
preference. 
121 I assume for simplicity that the official fully realizes the political benefit of having 
money to spend.  Of course, exaggerated, discounted or diminishing political returns on 
spending as well as on revenue-raising also seem possible.  See, e.g., JOHN KENNETH 
GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (4th ed. 1984); Wallace E. Oates, On the Nature and 
Measurement of Fiscal Illusion: A Survey, in TAXATION AND FISCAL FEDERALISM: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF RUSSELL MATHEWS 65, 67 (Geoffrey Brennan et al. eds., 1988) (raising the 
possibility of exaggerated returns due to “a systematic misperception of fiscal parameters – 
a recurring propensity, for example, to underestimate one’s tax liability associated with 
certain public programs”).  I set aside those cases here. 
122 I am not aware of any prior analysis in the legal literature of the possibility of local-
source tax discounting. 
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[FIGURE 2B] 
 
Figure 2A illustrates a world in which officials discount the costs to their 
constituents of accepting a grant.  At point P2 in this graph, the actual costs to 
the official’s constituents of accepting a federal grant are $100, but the official 
perceives the costs only to be $50.  At the same time, in Figure 2B, the 
perceived political cost of raising $51 in taxes is $51.  In this world, all grants 
reduce constituent welfare, and taxes again are no constraint.  At point P2, the 
official is willing to accept a grant of $51 with an actual cost of $100 because 
the perceived political cost of accepting the grant is only $50, and the political 
cost of substituting a tax would be $51. 
Figure 3 is where things start to get interesting. 
 
[FIGURE 3] 
 
In Figure 3, the political price of taxes, too, is discounted.  Thus, at P3, the 
political cost of raising $51 in funds from tax is approximately $40.80.  In this 
world, we should expect the official to refuse a $51 grant with a perceived cost 
of $50, because she can get the same money, at lower political cost, simply by 
raising taxes.  This observation leads us to the inequality, 
 
Dt * G > Dc * C 
 
This inequality expresses the relationship between Figures 2A and 3.  The 
left side represents the official’s discount rate for raising taxes (Dt) multiplied 
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by the grant amount (G).  The right side represents the official’s discount rate 
for accepting grant conditions (Dc) multiplied by the cost of accepting the 
grant (C).[ES: I think we should define these variables before beginning the 
discussion of the equation.  This is my understanding of the variables, but feel 
free to change my wording.]  Put simply, the inequality indicates that we 
should expect a rational official to accept a conditional federal grant only 
where the discounted political costs of raising an equivalent amount of money 
through taxation would exceed the discounted costs of accepting the grant.  For 
example, at a grant amount of $61.60, the perceived political costs either of 
accepting the grant or raising taxes are equal.  At any amount less than $61.60, 
the official rejects the grant.  At amounts in excess of $61.60, she accepts it.  
Assuming the conditions of the grant remain fixed, the official’s opportunity to 
substitute taxes for the federal grant increases the price of the grant. 
A bit more elementary algebra shows us the broad implications of these 
simple deductions.  Solving the inequality for the term “G,” the grant amount, 
yields a second relationship: 
 
G > (Dc / Dt) * C 
 
The term on the right represents the ratio of the official’s discount rate for 
accepting grant conditions over the discount rate for raising taxes.  In this 
model in which the rates are fixed and linear, the relationship between these 
two discount rates tells us whether grant amounts must be greater or less than 
the total cost of compliance.  Wherever officials discount the costs of accepting 
federal conditions by a greater percentage than they discount the cost of raising 
taxes, then C, the cost to taxpayers, will be multiplied by a number less than 
one (in my example, .5 / .8, or .625).123  That is, if officials discount the burden 
of federal conditions more than they discount the burden of taxation, then they 
will accept grants that do not pay fully for the burden on their constituents.  In 
this scenario, constituent welfare decreases.124[ES: I think this paragraph is a 
little confusing to a lay reader.  Do you think you can rephrase it somewhat?] 
But – and this is the key point – there is another scenario, in which officials 
discount the costs of raising taxes by a larger percentage than they discount the 
costs of grant compliance.  In those situations, C will be multiplied by a 
number larger than one, and the grant that the federal government would have 
to offer a state to accept its conditions must actually exceed the costs of 
 
123 That is, in the examples I have given, officials perceive only half of the costs of 
federal grant conditions, but perceive 80% of the costs of raising taxes.  So the discount on 
grant conditions is larger, at 50%, as compared with 20% for the discount on tax increases. 
124 Although net utility is negative in this example, note that the fact of tax discounting 
alongside grant-cost discounting has reduced the amount of negative utility incurred by the 
officials’ constituents.  If own-sources taxes were not an available option, the utility loss 
would have been the full discount rate, 50%, of the costs of complying with the grant 
conditions.  However, because of the tax consideration the loss is only 37.5%. 
Deleted: of the equation 
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acceptance. 
In other words, even if local officials discount the costs to their constituents 
of accepting federal conditions, the decision to accept the grant may still 
increase constituent welfare.125  If the cost of raising revenue from local taxes 
is discounted even more than the cost of accepting federal conditions, then the 
grant price demanded by the locality’s officials may be larger than the actual 
cost to their citizens of the conditions.  Thus, the political optics of grant 
conditions demonstrate only half the story; we also need to know how officials 
view tax increases. 
Two important objections to this line of thought spring immediately to 
mind.  First, given traditional taxpayer hostility to taxes, it may seem highly 
unlikely that officials would discount the costs of raising money through 
taxes.126  Additionally, one might wonder why, if local officials actually could 
generate further benefits for their constituents at a net gain in political capital, 
they have not done so already.  Arguably, the point at which local officials 
stopped raising taxes by definition is the equilibrium point between taxing and 
spending. 
Our intuition about taxpayer hostility to tax increases is probably right for 
the federal income tax, but perhaps rather less so when state and localities raise 
revenue through their other potential avenues.  For one thing, as I discuss later, 
local jurisdictions may “export” their tax costs to outsiders.127  For instance, 
Alaska and Montana impose “extraction” taxes on their mineral resources, 
which generally are shipped out of state.128  These efforts are not always 
successful.  An extraction tax may in fact hurt state residents more than it 
affects the out-of-state extractors, depending on whether the tax shifts mineral 
production elsewhere or drives down the price that the state’s producers 
 
125 Admittedly, however, the possibility of tax constraints on discounting may reduce 
overall welfare in some situations.  For example, I noted earlier that state officials may 
discount positive as well as negative spillovers.  If a given grant would generate a net 
positive externality, then the opportunity for local revenue will induce officials to refuse the 
grant, reducing welfare. 
126 See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Heuristics and Biases in Thinking About 
Tax 6-9 (Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch., Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper 
No. 03-22, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=467440 
(measuring “tax aversion” – that is, a person’s attitude toward calling something a “tax”). 
127 Cf. Gilbert E. Metcalf, Deductibility and Optimal State and Local Fiscal Policy, 39 
ECON. LETTERS 217, 221 (1992) (suggesting that opportunities for tax exporting may have 
made retaining sales tax cheaper than other alternatives); Stephen H. Pollock, Mechanisms 
for Exporting the State Sales Tax Burden in the Absence of Federal Deductibility, 44 NAT’L 
TAX J. 297, 299 (1991) (stating that the increase in state reliance on sales tax may be 
explained by the fact that “[t]he state sales tax is subject to a significant amount of 
exporting”).  On the concept of tax exporting generally, see Robert Tannenwald, Fiscal 
Disparity Among the States Revisited, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., July/Aug. 1999, at 4; infra 
text accompanying notes 166-173. 
128 See Tannenwald, supra note 127, at 7. 
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charge.129  But measuring these complex chains of economic effects is at best 
challenging.130 
The actual effectiveness of tax exporting probably does not matter for our 
purposes.  The point is that it may appear to any but the most expert analyst 
that the state successfully exports its tax burden.131  If voters believe that 
someone else is paying for a tax, it seems likely they will be less hostile to it.  
Thus, as Daniel Shaviro has argued, states may tend to favor taxes that look as 
though they are exported even if they are not.132  Tax scholars offer a similar 
argument for the persistence of the corporate income tax: since no one really 
knows who bears the “incidence,” or economic burden, of the corporate tax, 
individual voters tend to prefer it to other options.133 
The political science and psychological literatures suggest other ways in 
which “hidden” taxes may reduce voter ire.  For instance, voters tend not to 
notice the full impact of small fees and sales taxes on their financial situation, 
because these taxes arrive bit by bit, and often hidden inside other prices 
(quick: how much of the price of your gallon of gas is tax?).134  Voters also 
tend not to take the time or mental effort to add up these costs, even if they 
notice them.135  Thus, there is strong evidence that political opposition to 
 
129 Charles E. McClure, Jr., Tax Exporting and the Commerce Clause, in FISCAL 
FEDERALISM AND THE TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES 169, 171-83 (Charles E. McLure, 
Jr. & Peter Mieszkowski eds., 1983) [hereinafter McClure, Tax Exporting] (explaining, in a 
classic analysis, that the likely outcome of a tax levied on natural resources by a producing 
state will depend on “the conditions under which it is levied,” including “the degree of 
geographic concentration and the mobility of resources or industry, cartelization by taxing 
states, international competition or price umbrella effects, natural substitutability, 
government regulation, the prevalence of long-term contracts, the importance of 
transportation costs and the way in which such costs are determined, unionization, and 
market structure”); see also Charles E. McClure, Jr., Incidence Analysis and the Supreme 
Court: An Examination of Four Cases from the 1980 Term, 1 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 69, 87-89 
(1982) (concluding that coal sold under existing contracts would probably export the 
severance tax to non-resident consumers, but that this would not be the case for those sold 
under contracts negotiated after the passage of the tax); cf. Pollock, supra note 127, at 300 
(commenting that states are constrained in their use of exporting by the danger that such use 
may drive up costs of doing business, which may in turn reduce investment and jobs). 
130 McClure, Tax Exporting, supra note 129, at 169-70, 186-87. 
131 See Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 895, 956 (1992) [hereinafter Shaviro, Federalism in Taxation] (explaining 
that a severance tax may be directly borne by out-of-state consumers, but its real economic 
burden, even in the short term, cannot be determined without analyzing a multitude of 
factors). 
132 Id. at 957. 
133 See Charles E. McClure, Jr., Rethinking State and Local Reliance on the Retail Sales 
Tax: Should We Fix the Sales Tax or Discard It?, 2000 BYU L. REV. 77, 91-92. 
134 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD E. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: THE 
POLITICAL LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES 129 (1977); Campbell, supra note 103, at 305-06. 
135 Aradhna Krishna & Joel Slemrod, Behavioral Public Finance: Tax Design as Price 
   
2008] FEDERAL GRANTS, STATE DECISIONS 133 
 
“hidden” taxes of these forms is rather low compared to, for example, the 
individual income tax.136  Of course, it is possible that both hidden and more 
salient taxes still generate exaggerated voter ire, rather than being 
“discounted.”  But we at least have a plausible story for how local officials can 
create discounts by their choice of tax instruments. 
Let us turn back then to the second objection: the “equilibrium” argument.  
Again, the claim is that we might be able to presume that local officials, prior 
to the offer of a federal grant, have already imposed all the taxes they believe 
they can without incurring more political loss than gain.  Assuming that fiscal 
benefits are not discounted, the implication is that we have reached a point on 
the tax curve at which additional taxes will no longer be at a discount. 
There are a number of ways in which the equilibrium can change.  Local 
economic conditions can change, or new tax “instruments” can develop to 
permit less objectionable tax increases.137  The lobbying efforts that produce a 
political impetus for the federal grant project might also change local taxpayer 
preferences, increasing the returns to officials for enacting the policy with local 
funds.138  Some evidence suggests that taxpayers evaluate their tax situation 
relative to those of their neighbors, such that tax increases nearby make local 
tax increases more politically palatable.139 
The most convincing response, however, is probably that there often is no 
stable tax/benefit equilibrium.140  As observed by the economist Kenneth 
Arrow, voter preferences are not perfectly linear.141  Social choice theory 
 
Presentation, 10 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 189, 190-95 (2003); Edward J. McCaffery & 
Jonathan Baron, The Humpty Dumpty Blues: Disaggregation Bias in the Evaluation of Tax 
Systems, 91 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 230, 231-32 (2003). 
136 Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 135, at 192. 
137 That is, choices about how to structure a tax, and how to allocate its economic burden 
on various individuals and activities, might change public preferences for more or less tax.  
See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice And Public Interest: A Study Of The 
Legislative Process As Illustrated By Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 53, 
57-63 (1990).  For instance, one might think that a tax on an activity that is unlikely to 
change in response to taxation will reduce the amount of economic distortion that 
accompanies the tax, so although the total tax might remain the same, the societal costs of 
taxing decrease. 
138 Cf. Singhal, supra note 104, at 560 (emphasizing the possibility that lawsuits brought 
by interest groups may have a public-educative function that changes popular preferences 
for services related to the lawsuit). 
139 See Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, 
and Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 25, 30 (1995). 
140 See John E. Roemer, Distribution and Politics: A Brief History and Prospect, 25 SOC. 
CHOICE & WELFARE 507, 510-13, 523-24 (2005). 
141 KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 97-100 (2d ed. 1963) 
(proving that the no social welfare function can satisfy all four conditions of social choice 
theory); see also AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 35-51 
(1970).  For cogent explanations of Arrow’s theorem in laymen’s terms, see KENNETH A. 
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elaborates that an individual may prefer A to B and B to C, yet also prefer C to 
A.142  Thus, which outcome an individual settles on may depend on how he 
frames the alternatives and the order in which he considers them.143  In actual 
studies of legislative behavior, officials who initially chose A over B would 
sometimes switch to B upon the introduction of a third policy option, C.144  
Accordingly, the fact that a local legislature settled on a particular package of 
taxes and benefits is not necessarily evidence that voters would be unwilling to 
accept more taxes in exchange for more benefits.145 
In sum, my main point in this section is that predicting the welfare effects of 
state decisions to accept conditional grants is much more complicated than the 
existing literature would suggest.  It is not enough to forecast whether state 
officials will discount the costs of accepting grants.  To make good predictions, 
we also would have to forecast the relative discount rates of both the costs of 
accepting grants and the cost of raising taxes from local sources.146 
IV. OTHER SECOND-BEST INTERNALIZATION STORIES 
To this point I have attempted to show that it is uncertain whether officials 
offered federal grants will act as good agents for the electorate and make 
decisions that maximize welfare.  Notwithstanding these arguments, in this 
Part, I assume that officials act as poor agents.  Even under that assumption, it 
 
SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND 
INSTITUTIONS 63-81 (1997); Hebert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 293, 318-28 (1992). 
142 See Bernard Grofman, Some Notes on Voting Schemes and the Will of the Majority, 7 
PUB. CHOICE 65, 75 n.4 (1969); Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional 
Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472, 472 
(1976) (“[I]t is theoretically possible to design voting procedures which, starting from any 
given point, will end up at any other point in the space of alternatives . . . .”); Steven 
Slutsky, Equilibrium Under α-Majority Voting, 47 ECONOMETRICA 1113, 1119 (1979). 
143 See Saul Levmore, Voting Paradoxes and Interest Groups, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 
260 (1999); McKelvey, supra note 142, at 480-81. 
144 See WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION 
BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 214-32 (1982). 
145 See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as 
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. LAW & ECON. 239, 241-42 (1992).  Relatedly, positive political 
theory suggests that the end results of legislative processes may be produced more by the 
structure of the decision-making process than the underlying preferences of voters and 
legislators.  See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in 
Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 7-8 (1994). 
146 Of course, it is possible that there are easy short-cuts for estimating state officials’ 
attitudes towards tax increases.  For instance, if a state’s electorate had a strong preference 
for increased spending that persisted over time, but the state nonetheless did not raise taxes, 
that might suggest the perceived political costs of tax increases were quite large.  There is an 
argument that the “flypaper effect” I described earlier could be evidence of just such a tax 
shortfall.  See infra Part V. 
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remains possible that the personal motivations that drive officials, aside from 
the kinds of reelection-related motives canvassed in the earlier discussion of 
public choice theory, will produce outcomes quite similar to those that would 
result if there were perfect agency.  In this Part, I consider whether the self-
interest motivations of politicians may themselves preserve federalism values 
well enough to make judicial intervention unnecessary. 
A. Which Costs Matter? 
It obviously would be absurd to argue that state officials will, by chance, 
always have self-interested motivations that align their decisions with the 
interests of their constituents.  Federal grants cover the waterfront of policy 
questions, and the decision to accept a grant therefore may have a variety of 
subjectively negative effects.  Mandatory motorcycle helmet laws may reduce 
the welfare of those who enjoy both risk and the feeling of wind in their hair.  
But, the effect of interest groups aside, it is not clear why a self-interested state 
official would oppose such laws. 
Accordingly, the claim here is rather narrow.  I argue that only certain third-
party effects should concern federal courts.  Some prominent critics of 
conditional spending, including Professor Baker, have at times argued that 
conditional spending is unconstitutional because it reduces overall welfare.147  
These general claims about voter welfare prove far too much.  By themselves, 
they offer no account of why state legislative decisions, even those that may 
reduce statewide welfare, are grounds for federal judicial intervention.  States 
make bad decisions all the time, and so, of course, does Congress and other 
federal political actors.  But basic tenets of modern constitutional law reject as 
illegitimate and impractical such an expansive role for courts in setting aside 
the reasonable decisions of fairly-constituted legislatures.148  While there is 
surely a place for welfare maximization, that principle must be cabined by 
some federal interest derived from the Constitution or a federal statute that 
justifies federal judicial intervention. 
Probably the most prominent candidate for a federal interest underlying the 
 
147 Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 22, at 1950-53, 1972-73; Baker & Berman, 
Getting Off the Dole, supra note 5, at 474. 
148 E.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-183 (1980) (setting out, and 
justifying as consistent with existing doctrine, the author’s theory that the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s role is primarily to protect fair democratic processes, not to impose what it 
perceives as best policy results).  For an example of how expansive the welfare-
maximization theory could reach, consider that an anonymous Note author in the Harvard 
Law Review applies much the same analysis in effect to condemn generally any federal 
legislation crafted during a period in which the same political party controls both the White 
House and Congress.  Note, No Child Left Behind and the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 885, 900-901 (2006) [hereinafter Note, No Child Left 
Behind]. 
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Arlington rule is the diversity values of a federalist system of government.149  I 
do not claim this as an original insight on my part.  A hallmark of federal 
legislation is that it often displaces or prevents a diverse set of state or local-
level rules.150  One of federalism’s central goals – and in the views of some 
skeptics, such as Professors Rubin and Feely,151 its only goal – is exactly to 
preserve that diversity.152  Diversity produces many good ends such as 
opportunities for citizens to maximize their own happiness by locating in a 
jurisdiction with a congenial set of rules, chances to experiment with different 
solutions to similar problems, and competitive pressures on local governments 
to adopt the most appealing of these solutions.153  In addition, state freedom to 
diverge from federal rules may serve as a constraint on federal lawmaking by 
offering a sort of “vertical” competition between state and federal government 
for the most effective governance.154 
Accordingly, I do not endeavor to show here that state officials always 
improve national welfare, but only that they tend to protect state policy 
diversity.  I accept the claim that diversity is a constitutionally-grounded good 
 
149 See Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 22, at 1948; Baker & Berman, Getting 
Off the Dole, supra note 5, at 470 (stating that the judicial enforcement of states’ rights 
serves the function of protecting states “from federal homogenization in areas in which they 
deviate from the national norm,” which increases and preserves “diversity among the 
states”); Engdahl, supra note 4, at 85; Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and its Alternatives: 
A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1651 (2006); Somin, Closing the 
Pandora’s Box, supra note 16, at 464; Stewart, supra note 22, at 919-20. 
150 See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 60-61, 64-65 (1998) (explaining that the states can serve as experimental 
laboratories and thus the Supreme Court should limit the federal government’s ability to 
uniformly deny recognition of a right on a national level “before there has been a substantial 
period for experimentation”). 
151 Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National 
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 914-26 (1994) (arguing that “federalism allows the states 
to vary as they choose, pursuing their own policies instead of the national one,” and thus 
“can be justified only by arguments favoring a variety of policies, not by arguments 
favoring the implementation of a single policy by a variety of methods”). 
152 Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy of Federalism, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 73, 83-85 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997); McGinnis & 
Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights, supra note 20, at 106. 
153 For a sampling of the many interesting discussions on these points see, for example, 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. 
BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 
173-86 (1980); BREYER, supra note 27, at 56-65; Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: 
Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493-1500 (1987); Oates, supra 
note 101, at 1122-23; Stewart, supra note 22, at 918; Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 113, 
at 3-5. 
154 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: 
The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 380-95; Stewart, 
supra note 22, at 918. 
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whose protection may well be a federal judicial obligation.  In the remainder of 
this Part, I consider whether conditional spending poses any threat to that 
good.155  In particular, I claim that state officials’ decisions to accept 
conditional funds likely approximate the decisions such officials would reach 
if they were perfect agents of their constituents. 
One difficulty for this discussion, which I want to acknowledge at the 
outset, is the uncertainty in how officials would behave if they were perfect 
agents.  Decentralized decision-making is not an unmitigated good; the study 
of public finance is in many ways an effort to identify those instances in which 
centralized government is superior to local and vice-versa.156  Therefore, what 
I can show, at best, is that state officials will often have incentives of their own 
to take heed of the centralizing effects of federal grants.  I cannot show that 
these incentives produce the socially optimal level of decentralized 
government, because the socially optimal level is unknown.  My claim is 
simply that the divergence between the unknown optimal and some concern for 
decentralization is likely smaller than the gap between optimal and zero, which 
is the amount of concern critics seem to assume.  In this respect, my argument 
is quite similar to the political theory of the Dormant Commerce Clause, which 
posits that, while it is impossible for courts to specify just how much weight 
states should give to the effects of their actions on outsiders, the fact of some 
in-state surrogate for outside interests is sufficient to ward off judicial 
intervention.157 
B. Official Incentives to Produce Diversity 
Critics of conditional spending overlook significant incentives for state 
officials to actually over-produce decentralization and policy diversity.  To 
some extent these points are familiar, especially to those who study state and 
local taxation, although they have not yet found their way into the debate over 
conditional spending. 
First, there are a set of what we might call “race to the top” incentives for 
state officials that would tend to weigh against a decision to opt into a set of 
uniform federal rules.  Local jurisdictions compete against one another for 
mobile capital and productive citizens.158  An official who succeeds in that 
 
155 My arguments here also tend to demonstrate that conditional spending on average is 
welfare enhancing overall.  However, my argument does not rest on that point because, as I 
contend in the main text, determining the net welfare effect of a policy is the province 
mainly of legislatures, not federal courts. 
156 See generally Oates, supra note 101. 
157 See Shaviro, Federalism in Taxation, supra note 131, at 931-34; Mark Tushnet, 
Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 125, 130-33. 
158 See ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INTERJURISDICTIONAL 
TAX AND POLICY COMPETITION: GOOD OR BAD FOR THE FEDERAL SYSTEM? 60-63 (1991) ; 
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES ix (2001) (stating that 
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competition, at least relative to the yardsticks her constituents use for 
comparison,159 will likely reap political gains.160  These newcomers can offer 
additional tax revenues, added jobs, higher home values, and perhaps, aside 
from their revenue effects, lead to better schools and safer streets.161  At a 
minimum, the ability to attract outsiders perceived as valuable sends a positive 
signal to existing voters about the quality of their local government, and the 
reverse is almost certainly true.162  Thus, entrepreneurial officials should want 
to develop innovative new projects or new technologies, or methods for 
delivering old ones that offer a comparative advantage over their neighbors.163 
On the other hand, as Susan Rose-Ackerman and others have pointed out, if 
innovations are easy to copy, then perhaps there is a free-rider problem, and 
officials will not see enough reward in being the first politician to motivate 
much innovation.164  While the question is complex, overall it is likely there is 
 
the homeowner voters’ stake in local politics which makes them attentive to public policy 
may explain local governments’ race to the top in public education and environmental 
protection); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property & Federalism, 115 YALE 
L.J. 72, 103 (2005). 
159 In a relatively unregulated system of interjurisdictional competition, citizens lack 
information on which to compare the performance of their public officials.  Some empirical 
research suggests that voters may make up for this gap by using heuristics, or mental short-
cuts, such as rough comparisons between their own officials and those in other nearby 
jurisdictions, or perhaps between local and federal officials from their own jurisdiction.  
Besley & Case, supra note 139, at 29-31.  Thus, a candidate’s success in keeping taxes low 
may be judged, not in absolute terms, but in comparison to trends in tax rates in neighboring 
jurisdictions.  Id. 
160 See PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 17-18 (1995) (stating that local 
governments must provide public services that meet local businesses’ and residents’ needs 
to keep the citizens in-state because marginal businesses and marginal residents determine 
the market value of property in the locality); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, 
The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-
Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 207-09 (1997) (stating that under Tiebout’s model, a rational 
individual will choose a jurisdiction based on its taxes and available public goods); 
McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights, supra note 20, at 109 (arguing that there 
is an incentive to compete because if state governments can increase their tax base, they can 
use the increase in tax revenue to fund popular programs and gain the support of powerful 
interest groups). 
161 See Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit and Voice: User Participation in the Production 
of Local Public Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1, 88 (2001); McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs. 
States’ Rights, supra note 20, at 109. 
162 See BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 153, at 178; cf. Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, 
Democracy, and Development, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567 (1993), reprinted in READINGS IN 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 130, 139 (Kaushik Basu ed., 2003). 
163 See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 160, at 207-09. 
164
 David Lazer, Regulatory Capitalism as a Networked Order: The International 
System as an Informational Network, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 52, 55, 60 
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at least some motivation for local actors to innovate, albeit at below socially 
optimal levels.165 
Other aspects of state competition are less conducive to the national welfare 
but equally effective at making local officials disinclined to accept conditional 
federal grants that would reduce diversity and state autonomy.  For example, 
scholars of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence often 
describe states as eager to “export” their own costs to those who reside outside 
the state.166  A classic example is Delaware’s hefty tolls at the Delaware 
Memorial Bridge which represent a substantial portion of Delaware’s budget.  
Out-of-state travelers who drive the fifteen-mile stretch of I-95 that passes 
through Delaware largely bear the costs of the toll.167  Uniform sets of federal 
rules tend to greatly reduce state opportunities for cost exporting.168  The 
Constitution will usually prohibit outright discrimination, at least absent 
congressional authorization.169  Accordingly, states must craft legal rules that 
 
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594-95 (1980); Koleman S. Strumpf, Does Government 
Decentralization Increase Policy Innovation?, 4 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 207, 208 (2002); 
Lars P. Feld et al., Federalism, Decentralization, and Economic Growth 10 (Marburg 
Working Paper on Econ., No. 30/2004, 2004), available at http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02 
/makro/forschung/gelbereihe/artikel/2004-30-FederalismGrowthDP_gesamt.pdf. 
165 Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in 
Decentralized Governments 81-82 (Aug. 3, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1198835) (exploring whether states have an incentive to innovate 
despite the threat of free-riding). 
166 See Ernest J. Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the Position of the 
Judiciary, 67 YALE L.J. 219, 228-33 (1957); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and 
State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 
1091, 1191 (1986); Shaviro, Federalism in Taxation, supra note 131, at 910-12. 
167 See DEL. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DELAWARE TRANSPORTATION FACTS 2006 60-61 (2006), 
http://www.deldot.gov/information/pubs_forms/fact_book/pdf/2006/2006_deldot_fact_book
.pdf?22608; Federation of Tax Administrators, 2005 State Tax Collection by Source, 
http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/05taxdis.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2008) (sourcing 43.9% 
of Delaware’s collected taxes as coming from sources other than the individual income tax, 
corporate income tax and excise tax).[ES: I expanded this parenthetical so that the reader 
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168 See Galle, SSUTA, supra note 78, at 1399-1400. 
169 See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 576 
(1997) (“We have ‘consistently . . . held that the Commerce Clause . . . precludes a state 
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therefrom.’” (quoting New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 
(1982))); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 (1994) (finding a program 
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are facially neutral, but as a result of some distinctive feature of the state, 
produce disproportionate benefits for themselves.  That will typically be 
difficult if the state agrees to accept a single nationwide rule or set of rules. 
This foregone opportunity to discriminate is not only economically costly to 
the state but also politically costly to state officials.  Again, there is a strong 
public choice component to state officials’ preference for diverse sets of rules 
that permit them to attempt to export costs.  Out-of-state individuals certainly 
can participate in the political process of a state that exports its costs on them, 
albeit not generally with a simple vote.170  They can lobby, contribute money 
to well-disposed officials, organize any in-state interests that might be 
sympathetic, buy advertising against the undesired position, and so on.171  In 
addition, in some cases, the possibility that a heavily burdened outsider might 
relocate into the exporting state and consume resources there might force the 
state to consider the impact of its policies on the outsider.172  In many 
instances, however, it will be difficult for burdened out-of-state interests to 
organize as an effective political force because the interests are widely 
scattered, reside or do business primarily in many different places, and 
individually suffer only modest harms.173 
Even well-organized groups of outsiders may face the problem that they do 
business in or travel to hundreds or thousands of jurisdictions, meaning that 
they would have to carry out hundreds or thousands of ongoing monitoring, 
organizing, and lobbying efforts.174  This is precisely the dynamic that has led 
to more than 7,000 different sets of state and local sales tax regimes in the 
United States, notwithstanding the efforts of powerful nationwide retailers to 
curtail the ever-expanding diversification.175  Scholars of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause often point to these forms of political market failure – that 
is, the over-production of state diversity – in justifying their calls for more 
stringent judicial oversight of state regulations affecting interstate 
commerce.176 
 
170 See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 232 (5th ed. 2005). 
171 Id. 
172 See CHOPER, supra note 68, at 190-93. 
173 See Shaviro, Federalism in Taxation, supra note 131, at 931-32; Tushnet, supra note 
157, at 130-33. 
174 A typical solution for the out-of-state interest in this situation is to seek national 
legislation preempting the state and local rules.  See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference 
to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice 
Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 271-73 (1990); Revesz, supra note 98, at 
564.  The fierceness of many of these preemption battles, I believe, nicely demonstrates the 
scale of what local jurisdictions perceive to be at stake in their opportunity to set their own 
rules.  It follows that the price for accepting uniformity as a condition of a federal grant may 
be quite high. 
175 Galle, SSUTA, supra note 78, at 1394-1400. 
176 See Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional Acquiescence and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1764, 1767-68 (2004); Dan T. Coenen, 
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986 illustrates some other political costs of 
capitulating to federal offers.177  Among its many other provisions, the 1986 
Act eliminated a section of the Tax Code allowing taxpayers to deduct on their 
federal income tax return any state or local sales tax they had paid in a given 
tax year.178  State and local income and property taxes remained deductible.179  
In theory, deductibility should act almost exactly like a matching grant.180  
Local jurisdictions should shift their taxes to the forms that are deductible 
because the after-federal-tax price of raising money through deductible taxes is 
cheaper.  As a result, local jurisdictions can raise more money through those 
measures.181  Thus, the effect of the 1986 Act should have been that states 
would have a choice of either cutting taxes or shifting away from sales taxes.  
If anything, though, states increased their reliance on sales taxes after 1986, 
with no discernible pattern of changes in revenue levels.182  Needless to say, 
fiscal policy is highly complex, and there are probably many contributing 
causes for the shift to sales taxes.  Still, in essence, Congress offered the States 
a massive payment to switch away from sales taxes, and the States refused.183  
 
Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965, 984-97 (1998); 
Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State 
Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 442-43, 453-58 (1996); Maxwell L. 
Stearns, A Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical Analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 154-55 (2003). 
177 For more detailed discussion of the political and economic aspects of the 1986 
reform, see W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 124-
50 (1996); Alan J. Auerbach & Joel Slemrod, The Economic Effects of the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 589, 589-99 (1997). 
178 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 134(a)(1) (1986). 
179 26 U.S.C. § 164 (2006). 
180 See Charles E. McClure, Jr. & George R. Zodrow, Treasury I and the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986: The Economics and Politics of Tax Reform, 1 ECON. PERSP. 37, 55 (1987). 
181 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS 
FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 65 (1984); Bruce Bartlett, The Case for 
Eliminating Deductibility of State and Local Taxes, 28 TAX NOTES 1121, 1122-23 (1985) 
(“[D]eductibility of state and local taxes has been estimated to increase total state and local 
government spending by as much as 20.5 percent . . . .”); Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Harvey 
Rosen, Federal Deductibility and Local Property Tax Rates, 27 J. URB. ECON. 269, 270-71, 
289, 291 (1990). 
182 Paul N. Courant & Edward M. Gramlich, The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
on State and Local Behavior, in DO TAXES MATTER? THE IMPACT OF THE TAX REFORM ACT 
OF 1986 243, 244-63 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1990); Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Exporting, Federal 
Deductibility, and State Tax Structure, 12 J. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 109, 111 (1993); 
Pollock, supra note 127, at 298. 
183 Professor Pollock estimates that, as a result of the mechanics of deductibility, sales-
tax deductibility resulted in about a six percent savings to states prior to 1986.  Pollock, 
supra note 127, at 298.  He deems this a small amount, although for many states it amounted 
to half a billion dollars or more per year.  Id. 
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As we have seen, one likely contributing cause was that States perceived an 
opportunity to export tax costs through sales taxes, a mechanism that is not 
easily duplicated with taxes on income or real property.184 
The political economy of taxation, however, offers an equally plausible 
explanation for state responses to the 1986 Act.  Abandoning sales taxes would 
have meant abandoning a system of potentially infinite variety, with 
corresponding impacts on varying consumers and producers.  Keeping the 
sales tax in place offered officials the opportunity to demand rents from 
various groups either to forebear from taxation or to continue taxation on 
others.185  One can generalize this lesson: anytime state officials credibly bind 
themselves to a unified system, they will lessen opportunities to extract rents 
from constituents – that is, they can demand less in exchange for a promise not 
to enact or change a rule.186  And state officials must share any credit for good 
outcomes that result (for example, from the macroeconomic effects of wise 
taxation) with officials from the federal government and other states involved 
in the nationwide bargain.187  Therefore, local officials have strong political 
incentives to maintain distinctive and diverse sets of rules. 
One could argue, however, that state fondness for sales taxes rests most 
heavily on the simple fact that they are difficult for taxpayers to notice.  Few 
taxpayers tally their yearly sales tax bills.  Income and property taxes almost 
certainly have more “salience” for the average taxpayer – they are easier to 
 
grants.  For example, many states initially refused Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
grants.  Volden, supra note 61, at 227.  Others refused Clinton-era grants to pay for local 
teachers and police officers.  Id. 
184 See Pollock, supra note 127, at 299.  On the relative difficulty of tax exporting with 
income taxes, see supra text accompanying notes 166-169. 
 The economics literature includes two other hypotheses for the unexpected adherence to 
sales taxes in the wake of the 1986 Act.  As Gilbert Metcalf points out, less-than-full 
deductibility of sales taxes prior to 1986, together with the lower tax benefit of deductibility 
that came with 1986’s lower federal tax brackets, may have compounded the allure of the 
opportunity to keep sales taxes as a tool for exporting taxes onto other jurisdictions.  
Metcalf, supra note 127, at 220-21.  Howard Chernick also suggests that states may have 
adjusted their mix of sales and other taxes in order to restore a desired level of progressivity 
following the changes of the 1986 Act.  Howard Chernick, A Model of the Distributional 
Incidence of State and Local Taxes, 20 PUB. FIN. Q. 572, 572-75 (1992). 
185 Cf. FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND 
POLITICAL EXTORTION 26-29 (1997) (claiming that public officials enact regulatory regimes 
in order to demand rents from private parties for granting exemptions or forbearing from 
further regulation); id. at 124-31 (applying rent extraction theory to taxes and user fees). 
186 Cf. Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REV. 567, 572-776, 586-91 
(1996) (arguing that Congress can extract greater rents where it can offer interest groups 
assurances that it will be able to fulfill their demands in the future). 
187 Cf. Volden, supra note 61, at 219 (claiming that state governments likely prefer not to 
share credit for successful programs with federal government). 
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know and more prominent in the taxpayer’s mind when she goes to vote.188  
Experimental work in taxpayer psychology supports this intuition: individuals 
are willing to pay more tax if the tax comes in small, bite-sized pieces.189  
Thus, while income and property taxes may have been cheaper as a matter of 
fiscal reality, as a matter of voter perception – and therefore of officials’ 
preferences – sales taxes looked cheaper.190  This illustrates that states may 
well turn down grants, as they turned down the implicit matching grant offered 
in the 1986 Act, where the political cost of substituting their own tax revenue 
is lower. 
To sum up, public choice analysis indeed predicts, as critics of conditional 
spending maintain and as Justice O’Connor claimed in New York v. United 
States, that state officials may not fully take into account the national interest 
in federalism when considering offers from Congress.191  However, a more 
complete survey of the political factors at work suggests that the question is 
complicated.  There are significant reasons to doubt whether Justice 
O’Connor’s generalization about the breadth and depth of the benefits and 
burdens of grants is correct.  Perhaps more significantly, state officials have 
very powerful incentives to resist uniformity, even against the temptation of 
funds they need not impose taxes to obtain.  While I know of no good metric 
for determining how much a state official “discounts” the federalism costs of 
accepting a grant, it would be very surprising if diversity is not prized by those 
officials at least as highly as the welfare benefits it creates. 
Finally, I freely acknowledge the limitations of my analysis on this front.  
For the most part my discussion here has assumed that, in keeping with the 
bulk of the public choice literature, officials maximize their own welfare, or at 
best, their opportunities for enacting their own set of ideological 
preferences.192  However, individuals may also be motivated by beliefs about 
the norms and obligations of their role in society.193  Norms, in turn, may be 
sensitive to the institutional structure in which officials must operate.194  Thus, 
 
188 See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 
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189 See Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 135, at 193-94. 
190 The 1986 Act may have in fact accelerated the move to sales taxes by decreasing their 
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realizing the full extent of the burden they were bearing each year. 
191 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183 (1991); Somin, False Dawn, supra 
note 7, at 137-38. 
192 See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY 134-36, 167-70 (1965); 
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institutions for carrying on interstate agreements should reflect in part our 
hopes for developing norms consistent with the mission of the agreement.195  I 
therefore am open to the argument that the real debate in conditional spending 
should be over how to design government in a way to mitigate the temptations 
of state officials to sell out their constituents rather than whether state officials 
suffer such temptations. 
That conclusion leads to a larger point about the clear statement rule 
generally.  The diversity values of federalism do not support the outcome in 
Arlington and its ancestors.  All parties at the table in a negotiation over a 
conditional grant have good reasons to take into account the value of diversity 
in their decision.  There is not yet any convincing explanation of why state and 
local officials would systematically under-value diversity as compared to other 
goods, especially in light of the possibility that local taxes might substitute for 
burdensome federal dollars.  I agree that, in theory, a court might be licensed to 
reject local decisions to accept funds where there is obvious political-process 
failure.  However, it is hard to see how a court could reliably make that 
judgment even in individual cases, given the thicket of conflicting factors 
identified above. 
V. CREDIT, BLAME, AND FISCAL PRESSURES (OR LACK THEREOF?) 
My second-best story about official incentives to respect the need for 
decentralized government so far neglects two other potential federal values that 
may be served by curtailing conditional federal spending.  In this Part, I 
consider accountability and vertical cost exporting.  On the accountability 
front, I argue that concerns that federal grants may confuse voters about whom 
to credit or blame for policy outcomes are largely overblown except in one or 
two special cases.  Where local jurisdictions would be unable to self-finance 
their residents’ preferences for essential local services, or are unable to obtain 
funds for less-vital services because of outside constraints, there is a stronger 
argument that the state official should not be “blamed” for the consequences of 
accepting federal funds.  Similarly, on the exporting question, where local 
governments are needy, there is an inference that Congress would be able to 
export more easily the costs of regulation.  Thus, the bulk of this section 
questions whether these two scenarios ever arise.  I conclude that they are, at 
best, seldom seen in the modern United States.  That fact suggests little need 
for a judicial role in protecting local government from Congress. 
A. Accountability and Coercion 
Federal mandates to state officials raise the possibility that voters will 
 
Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 585-86 (1998); 
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 338, 355-66 (1997). 
195 I have argued this point elsewhere.  Galle, SSUTA, supra note 78, at 1433-34. 
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ultimately blame the state officials for any bad outcomes, thereby distorting the 
political process at both national and local levels.196  Some commentators have 
argued that the same dynamic is at play in conditional grants.197  State 
decisions to accept funds subject to Congress’s conditions may confuse voters 
about whom to blame for the burdens that result.198  Evidently, the suggestion 
is that voters ought properly to blame Congress rather than their local 
official.199 
Standing alone this voter-confusion story is not very persuasive.  It may be 
true that voters will in part blame their local officials for the results of 
conditional grants, but that is not confusion at all.  It takes two to contract, and 
local officials who make bad deals should be held to account for them, whether 
those deals are with trash-collection contractors or Congress.200 
One might construct a more persuasive accountability argument based on 
Professor Baker’s claim that Congress often effectively coerces states into 
accepting federal offers.201  This argument might posit that state officials 
should not bear blame for accepting the offer they cannot refuse.  The 
difficulty is that Baker sees coercion in virtually every federal-state 
 
196 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
197 See Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 16, at 825-27 (arguing the voter 
confusion point could be applied to all intergovernmental arrangements, but stating that this 
is a reason to believe the argument proves too much); McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs. 
States’ Rights, supra note 20, at 91; Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State 
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 48-50 (1988); Stewart, 
supra note 22, at 958; Note, No Child Left Behind, supra note 148, at 902-03. 
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4, at 124; Siegel, supra note 149, at 1657; Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box, supra note 
16, at 485; Stewart, supra note 22, at 958; Young, Two Cheers, supra note 22, at 1360; 
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Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141, 203 (2002); Note, Federalism, Political 
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Child Left Behind, supra note 148, at 902-03; Note, Federalism, Political Accountability, 
and the Spending Clause, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1420 (1994) [hereinafter Note, 
Federalism]. 
199 See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 4, at 124-25; Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box, 
supra note 16, at 485; Young, Two Cheers, supra note 22, at 1360-61; Zietlow, supra note 
198, at 203; Note, Federalism supra note 198, at 1420, 1429. 
200 Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 100 
(2001) (arguing that officials remain free to point out to their constituents that they are not 
responsible for decisions of other officials).  Notably, in recent political events voters seem 
to have had little trouble in blaming what they perceive as maladministration of the war in 
Iraq on President Bush’s administration as well as the Congress that voted to authorize it. 
 In any event, as I have noted before, careful institutional design can largely cure any 
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201 Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 22, at 1936-39. 
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exchange.202  She claims that states are so hard-pressed to raise funds that they 
must accept federal grants.203 
It is doubtful that situations such as those offered by Baker, in which state 
officials are reluctant to raise their own revenue, are coercive in any 
meaningful sense.204  If government services are too expensive at the state 
level, then state government could simply choose not to provide them.  If they 
are essential services, the federal government can provide them instead.  In 
essence, it seems as though Baker’s point really is that accepting federal 
dollars is politically cheaper for state officials than raising funds themselves, 
along the lines illustrated with the figures in Part III above.205  This more 
modest claim would not buttress any argument about accountability.  The 
accountability concern is that voters will mistakenly blame state officials for 
federal officials’ choices.  If state officials have themselves chosen, out of 
political expediency, to piggyback on federal efforts, it is difficult to see why 
any blame voters attach to the state officials would be misplaced.206 
To be fair, there are some situations that would present a closer question.  
Imagine, for example, a region where citizens cannot afford to provide truly 
essential services for themselves.  In this region, the central government does 
not provide those services, and the local government is severely constrained in 
its revenue-raising capacity for reasons beyond its own control.  In this 
scenario, it may be unfair for voters to blame their local government for any 
conditions the central government attaches to its grants.207  A large measure of 
the uncertainty here is based on the problem that concepts like “blame,” 
“choice,” “coercion,” and “republican government” are not easy to define, at 
least not without controversy.208  I am willing to concede here that close 
 
202 Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending and States’ Rights, 574 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 104, 106 (2001) (“[T]he federal government has a monopoly power 
over the various sources of state revenue, which renders any offer of federal funds to the 
states presumptively coercive.” (emphasis added)); see Baker, Conditional Spending, supra 
note 22, at 1936-39; Baker & Berman, Getting Off the Dole, supra note 5, at 519-21. 
203 See Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 22, at 1935-38. 
204 See Engdahl, supra note 4, at 82-83. 
205 Cf. Baker & Berman, Getting Off the Dole, supra note 5, at 520, 535-36 
(acknowledging that states may have a “choice” to decline funds, but arguing that as a 
normative matter, the states’ choices are  unfairly narrow). 
206 Perhaps the argument in response would be that voters will attach too much blame to 
their state officials, relative to some outside, objective standard of political 
blameworthiness.  But any such argument would depend on a theory of political 
accountability that to date no one on either side of the spending debate has articulated. 
207 Cf. Sullivan, supra note 63, at 1492-96 (arguing that conditions attached to grants of 
aid may be deserving of closer judicial attention if political failures result in the federal 
government assuming too much power relative to ideal constitutional design, and that such 
an arrangement might be described as “coercive” in some sense). 
208 See Siegel, supra note 149, at 1656.  Professor Baker straightforwardly acknowledges 
the difficulty of defining these concepts; indeed, one of her arguments for her own approach 
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judicial scrutiny may well be appropriate in situations that would squarely 
present the need to make such judgments.  However, those situations do not 
likely arise with any frequency in the United States, as Part V.C. illustrates. 
B. Accountability and Vertical Cost Exporting 
If Congress can oblige state governments to bear the cost of implementing 
federal policies, then Congress does not internalize its own costs.  The federal 
government may then produce too much regulation or regulation that is 
inefficiently priced.209  Voters may also be induced to shift responsibility from 
local government to Congress, because it appears that Congress can 
accomplish its ends at lower cost.210  Thus, as Bruce La Pierre has argued, one 
way to understand the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence is as an effort 
to ensure that Congress internalizes all of the tax cost of regulation.211 
This cost-exporting rationale seems to have little bite when it comes to 
conditional spending.212  The costs of implementing policy by means of 
conditional spending are often quite large because of opportunities for strategic 
behavior by individual states.213  Individual states, particularly those which are 
confident the federal government cannot act without their cooperation, can 
“hold out” for payoffs that exceed their costs.214  Part IV analyzed a number of 
other political economy considerations that tend to weigh against the 
possibility that local officials will “discount” the costs Congress seeks to shift 
to them.215  As a result, those costs will be passed back to Congress as the 
payout price for accepting any accompanying conditions.  Finally, to the extent 
that Congress does succeed in exporting some of its costs, it does so at the 
price of sharing credit for any beneficial outcomes with state officials.216  This 
 
to the Spending Clause is that it presents a bright-line alternative that approximates her 
sense of the best notion of coerciveness.  See Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 22, at 
1972-74; Baker & Berman, Getting Off the Dole, supra note 5, at 485, 521-22. 
209 See Siegel, supra note 149, at 1644. 
210 Again, this may be largely another way of restating the diversity argument.  See supra 
Part IV.B. 
211 See D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process–
The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 577, 644-46 
(1985); cf. Stewart, supra note 22, at 966. 
212 Cf. La Pierre, supra note 211, at 658-60 (arguing that cost exporting is not a concern 
where the federal government requires a state to act as a condition of the federal 
government’s refrain from preempting the state, on the theory that if the state refuses the 
federal government it would in fact have to pay costs of preemption). 
213 See Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 16, at 880-83. 
214 See Galle, Getting Spending, supra note 11, at 188-89. 
215 See supra text accompanying notes 145-197. 
216 Cf. Volden, supra note 61, at 218-19 (arguing that local governments expend their 
own funds on top of federal grants in order to ensure they will receive some credit for 
programs, and may turn down some grants in order to avoid sharing credit). 
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will tend to diminish the political rewards that federal lawmakers realize from 
regulating, and therefore constrain the overproduction or inefficient production 
of regulation.217 
In any event, for either of these rationales one does not need to rely on broad 
predictions about institutional behavior or national circumstances.  The States’ 
fiscal standing can be tested empirically.  Even if we cannot get an exact 
diagnosis, we can at least take the States’ fiscal temperature.  In particular, we 
can examine data on what states do with the money they get from federal 
grants.  I take up that challenge in the next section. 
C. Testing the Coercion and Exporting Hypotheses 
As outlined in the last two sections, there are two plausible arguments for 
restraining state agreements to accept conditional spending.  In extreme 
situations, state officials might be so desperate for funds that they feel 
“coerced” into accepting and perhaps should not receive blame for accepting 
the conditions attached to a federal grant.218  Alternatively, Congress might use 
conditional spending to export the costs of regulation.219  This section subjects 
both of these claims to testing against existing empirical research.  In addition, 
reviewing the states’ fiscal standing may shed some light on the extent to 
which their own-source revenues may reduce the appeal of grants, as outlined 
in Part III. 
1. “Flypaper” Effects as Measures of State Fiscal Standing? 
Both of these accountability arguments ultimately depend on further claims 
about the states’ fiscal conditions.220  The coercion point arises convincingly 
only where it is genuinely difficult for states to raise funds for essential 
services.  As for the danger of cost-exporting, logically that possibility could 
arise only where Congress can persuade a state to regulate (as a condition of a 
grant) for less than it would cost the federal government to regulate directly.  It 
is difficult to analyze or predict the relative cost structures of different levels of 
government, particularly because decentralized regulation may have efficiency 
gains that counter-balance any centralized economies of scale, depending on 
program design.221  However, as Part III showed, if federal money looks 
 
217 There also is an argument that there are some federal goods we should be happy to 
see “over-produced.”  For example, if we think that for other political-process reasons 
Congress does not ordinarily do enough to protect the rights of oppressed or neglected 
political minorities, then cost exporting would be a way of subsidizing more expansive 
federal efforts.  If those costs are borne by state governments who themselves under-
produce rights regulations, then the state governments probably have little grounds for 
complaint. 
218 See supra Part V.A. 
219 See supra Part V.B. 
220 Cf. Adler, supra note 6, at 1208. 
221 A complicating point here is that while it may be demonstrably cheaper to regulate at 
Deleted:  (“The degree of coercion 
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substantially “cheaper” than locally-generated funds, state officials may be 
willing to accept federal projects at a discount.222 
Existing econometric studies on the “flypaper effect” might bear 
significantly on both questions.  Again, the flypaper effect is a wide-spread 
phenomenon in which vertical grants induce the grant recipients to spend more 
than expected on the targeted grant activity.223  One possible inference drawn 
from these studies is that state and local governments are short of cash.224  That 
is, spending increases because the local jurisdiction prefers more services prior 
to the grant but it is unable to generate the tax revenues to meet those 
preferences.  Thus, a persistent flypaper effect for essential government 
services could strongly support at least one component of the coercion 
argument – the claim that local government and local residents could not 
obtain those services on their own. 
Alternatively, the flypaper effect data might support the story that states 
view federal money as “cheaper” than their own.  For example, the economist 
Jonathan Hamilton has argued the possibility that more efficient taxes at the 
federal level cause the flypaper effect.225  If federal taxation is more efficient, 
 
one level or another, we have to be certain to compare the costs of similar quality outputs.  
Federal regulation may be cheaper, but of lower quality, or vice-versa. 
222 For example, suppose it would cost Congress $100 to implement the Widget 
Protection Act of 2008 in the state of South Utopia (“SU”).  It will similarly cost the South 
Utopian government $100 in real dollars to implement the Act.  SU residents believe they 
receive no benefit at all from the Act.  However, Congress offers SU a $90 grant on the 
condition that it will agree to administer the Act.  Because of various discounting effects, 
SU lawmakers perceive the cost of implementation as $80.  I claimed in Part III.[ES: There 
is no III.D.  Do you just want this to be Part III?] that the determining factor in whether SU 
officials will accept the grant offer is their perceived cost of raising $90 from the SU tax 
base.  If they perceive the cost as less than $80, they will reject Congress’s offer.  Congress 
then must bear the entire $100 itself.  If SU perceives their tax cost as higher than $80, then 
they will accept the grant, and Congress will have succeeded in exporting some of the costs 
of implementing the Widget Protection Act. 
223 To review, we should expect that unmatched grants would on average have only a 
weak impact on recipient spending.  Giving a state of 1,000 people a $1 million grant is 
fiscally identical to giving each resident $1,000.  If residents generally prefer to spend eight 
cents of each dollar on government services, then the grant will simply increase spending by 
$80 per capita, or $80,000 of the $1 million, allocated in proportion to preferences for 
various services.  Tax cuts or spending reductions will “offset” the remainder.  In the 
flypaper effect studies, however, grants tended to increase spending by far more than the 
existing rate, sometimes by as much as dollar-for-dollar (or, in rare cases, even more).  
Additionally, grants tend to be spent largely in their targeted category, rather than being 
redistributed according to existing distributions of government spending.  See supra Part 
II.B. 
224 Cf. Lutz, supra note 103, at 24 n.22 (“Low income communities, which have 
relatively high [property] tax rates, may be constrained from their optimal education 
expenditure from fear of losing their commercial real estate base.”). 
225 Jonathan H. Hamilton, The Flypaper Effect and the Deadweight Loss from Taxation, 
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the federal government can extract more money than states from the same base 
(or they can extract the same amount of money at lower overall economic 
cost).226  Voters’ marginal preference for government services should shift 
upwards when revenue is raised through federal instruments, because their tax 
price in effect is lower than it was when the state levied their taxes.227  
Hamilton’s research therefore shows that the flypaper data suggest federal 
taxes are literally cheaper than local taxes.[ES JH: Add FN for support] 
We might be able to tell a similar story about perceived tax costs.  Federal 
revenues could potentially derive from sources the local taxpayers perceive as 
imposing a smaller economic burden.228  That, in turn, might incline officials 
to substitute federal grant dollars for local revenues.  Flypaper studies would 
not tell us anything directly about the relative discount rates of local taxes as 
compared to the perceived burdens of any given grant condition, because they 
deal with unconditional, unmatched grants.  But, if the perceived economic 
burden account held up, it would at least give us significant information about 
the likely attitude of voters about local taxes.  Large flypaper effects would 
suggest that the discount rate for local taxes is small or negative, diminishing 
the likelihood they would constrain decisions to accept funds.  If nothing else, 
these results might offer a starting place for judicial scrutiny of conditional 
grant transactions.  Instances of large flypaper effects in response to federal 
grants might occasion more careful consideration of the terms of the grant 
 
19 J. URB. ECON. 148, 148-50, 153-54 (1986); see also Brennan & Pincus, supra note 104, 
at 232, 238-39 (proposing a model for the flypaper effect based on “differential tax 
efficiency”); Volden, supra note 61, at 221, 224-25 (modeling the assumption that federal 
grants are more attractive to local governments when the federal government is more 
efficient at raising funds). 
226 See Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, Deadweight Costs and the Size of 
Government, 46 J.L. & ECON. 293, 303 (2003); Hamilton, supra note 225, at 153 
(explaining how individuals avoid state taxes by moving away from the jurisdiction or 
purchasing goods in other jurisdictions, thereby decreasing the revenue efficiency of state 
taxes); Volden, supra note 61, at 224-25. 
227 See Becker & Mulligan, supra note 226, at 306, 308; Brennan & Pincus, supra note 
104, at 236, 238; Hamilton, supra note 225, at 153.  Here is another simple numeric 
example.  Suppose South Utopian (“SU”) citizens prefer to spend $.08 per dollar of their 
personal income on government services paid for with SU tax funds.  To obtain that $.08 in 
tax, the SU government in fact causes other economic distortions that result in an actual 
economic burden of $.12 per dollar on each SU citizen.  So the citizens actually were 
willing to pay $.12 per dollar for services, but received only $.08 per dollar in value.  Now 
suppose that federal taxation of $.08 per dollar, combined with attendant distortions, 
produces a burden of only $.10 per dollar on SU citizens.  If the federal government gives 
SU a $1 million grant, SU citizens should be willing to spend more of it than their own 
income.  They can spend more and still bear only a $.12 per dollar burden.  To be precise, 
they should be willing to spend 80% of 12 cents (.08/.10 = X/.12), or 9.6 cents on the dollar. 
228 Cf. Fisher, supra note 99, at 342 (“[F]iscal illusion may cause individuals to perceive 
different tax increases than those that actually occur or individuals may respond to tax 
increases on the basis of some perceived use of the money.”). 
Comment [BDG2]: There’s no 
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conditions. 
Unfortunately, the theoretical picture of the flypaper effect is rather 
muddled.  Critics of the efficiency theory argue that it explains only a very 
small portion of observed flypaper effects.229  Some studies show only 
temporary flypaper effects or none at all.230  Further, there are a variety of 
explanations for the observed data, perhaps none of them entirely inconsistent 
with the others.231  In the next subpart I try to sort these issues out.232 
2. The Flypaper Data 
By one count there are more than ten theories to account for observed 
flypaper effects.233  One set of hypotheses, as I noted, suggest that grant 
recipients increase expenditures because federal dollars are cheaper or 
represent tax funds they could not themselves easily raise.234  A number of 
others posit rational or irrational voter ignorance combined with political 
opportunism by public officials as the cause of the flypaper effect.235  In these 
 
229 Peter Mieszkowski, Comments on Chapter 5, in MODERN PUBLIC FINANCE 157, 159-
60 (John M. Quigley & Eugene Smolensky eds., 1994). 
230 See Bailey & Connolly, supra note 102, at 339-42; Gordon, supra note 103, at 1773. 
231 See Fisher, supra note 99, at 324; Hines & Thaler, supra note 29, at 220-22; Lutz, 
supra note 103, at 1. 
232 A reasonable question for the reader to ask at this point would be whether there might 
be a more direct measure of a state’s fiscal situation.  Unfortunately, the most common 
economic tools for measuring state “fiscal capacity” and “financial need” are themselves 
problematic in a number of ways.  See Stephen M. Barro, State Fiscal Capacity Measures: 
A Theoretical Critique, in MEASURING FISCAL CAPACITY 51, 81-84 (H. Clyde Reeves ed., 
1986); Max B. Sawicky, The “Total Taxable Resources” Definition of State Revenue-
Raising Ability, in 1 U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS: TECHNICAL 
PAPERS 63, 78-94 (1986); Tannenwald, supra note 127, at 4.  A particular problem for our 
purposes is that there appears to be no neutral way of measuring the financial “needs” of a 
state without first defining what forms and levels of services state and local governments 
ought to provide.  Id. at 7.  For instance, the leading measure of “need” simply analyzes the 
costs a state would incur if it provided the same bundle of services offered by the “average” 
U.S. state.  Id. at 7-8.  As authors of these studies note, many states that appear “needy” 
under this metric in fact may have a preference for a low level of government services, such 
that they could comfortably provide those services even under fairly tight budgets.  Id. at 16, 
19-22.  Thus, the appeal of the inferential flypaper approach I suggest here is that it might 
account for the local jurisdiction’s own perception of its fiscal capacity and its “need” for 
government services.  It is worth noting, though, that the flypaper studies deal almost 
exclusively with unconditional grants, so that applying their findings to conditional grants 
does require a bit of an inferential leap. 
233 See Bailey & Connolly, supra note 102, at 342-47. 
234 See Becker & Mulligan, supra note 226, at 306, 308; Brennan & Pincus, supra note 
104, at 230, 232; Hamilton, supra note 225, at 153; Lutz, supra note 103, at 24 n.22. 
235 Bae & Feiock, supra note 107, at 580-81; Bailey & Connolly, supra note 102, at 348-
49; William R. Dougan & Daphne A. Kenyon, Pressure Groups and Public Expenditures: 
The Flypaper Effect Reconsidered, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 159, 160 (1988); Lars P. Feld & 
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views, voters fail to notice grants, value them improperly, or do not realize that 
grant dollars could be viewed as equivalent to their own tax payments.236  
Public officials take advantage of these misperceptions to expand their own 
operations without having to raise taxes.237  Alternatively, even fairly virtuous 
public officials serving less-than-fully-informed voters might direct grant 
dollars to spending rather than tax cuts out of fear that federal funds might dry 
up in the near future, leaving local officials in the position of raising taxes to 
return to their original level of funding.238 
Two other explanations draw on the fact that federal grants are a repeated 
game.239  In one of these theories, the argument is that all grants are really 
implicitly matching grants.240  Remember the flypaper effect is an expected 
result, rather than a surprise, for matching grants.241  If local officials spend 
their money in a way that displeases the grant-makers, they will not receive 
money next time.242  Therefore, the grantees spend money largely as the 
grantor allocates it (at least if there is any evident monitoring by the grantor).  
In another repeated game story, grants sometimes result from political effort on 
the part of local constituencies, who local officials reward in order to 
encourage similar efforts by others in the future.243  As a result, some portion 
of the grant sticks to the categories urged by the successful local coalition.244 
One challenge for all the theories is to explain not only why overall local 
 
Christoph A. Schaltegger, Voters as a Hard Budget Constraint: On the Determination of 
Intergovernmental Grants, 123 PUB. CHOICE 147, 151, 167 (2005); Filimon et al., supra note 
103, at 52; Hines & Thaler, supra note 29, at 223; Lutz, supra note 103, at 29-30; Mitias & 
Turnbull, supra note 103, at 347-48; Turnbull, supra note 103, at 3-7. 
236 See Feld & Schaltegger, supra note 235, at 149-52; Filimon et al., supra note 103, at 
57; Hines & Thaler, supra note 29, at 223. 
237 See Bae & Feiock, supra note 107, at 580-81; Filimon et al., supra note 103, at 52, 
57. 
238 Bailey & Connolly, supra note 102, at 343, 346-47; James W. Fossett, On Confusing 
Caution and Greed: A Political Explanation of the Flypaper Effect, 26 URB. AFF. Q. 95, 95-
97, 106-07 (1990); Volden, supra note 61, at 227; cf. Gordon, supra note 103, at 26 (“If 
districts do not anticipate permanent changes in revenue, they may be hesitant to increase 
total spending.”).  Thus, this version of the theory depends on the assumption that the 
political costs of raising taxes tend to be larger than the political rewards of cutting taxes.  
There is a fair amount of empirical research to support that assumption.  E.g., Bae & Feiock, 
supra note 107, at 585; Fossett, supra, at 107-09; Louise Marshall, New Evidence on Fiscal 
Illusion: The 1986 Tax “Windfalls,” 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1336, 1342 (1991); Mitias & 
Turnbull, supra note 102, at 355, 361. 
239 See Knight, supra note 103, at 71-72 (modeling a legislative bargaining model of 
intergovernmental grants); Singhal, supra note 104, at 8 n.9. 
240 See Baicker, supra note 103, at 150; Fisher, supra note 99, at 338. 
241 See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text. 
242 See Baicker, supra note 103, at 152. 
243 See Singhal, supra note 104, at 549. 
244 Id. 
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spending increases in response to a grant, but also why spending increases in 
the actual category targeted by the grant.245  By themselves the underinformed 
voter narratives struggle with that point.246  It is not clear why local officials 
would choose to spend their “free” resources only on the activities encouraged 
by the grantor.  The hypothesis is that officials will take advantage of voter 
ignorance to use federal money for their own purposes.  It would be a very 
large coincidence if the purposes of the federal officials authorizing the grant 
and the local officials accepting it happened to align.  Even if both grantor and 
grantee officials are responding to what they perceive as the spending areas 
likely to deliver the largest political rewards, individual official preferences 
among services, the information available to the two sets of officials, and the 
constituencies most closely tied to the officials should all vary considerably. 
The cash-strapped states theories are more compelling on this point.  
Proponents of those notions could posit that officials need federal funds when 
there are real public needs going unmet, and therefore, a large political reward 
available to whomever can meet them.  Both grantor and grantee officials, in 
an effort to capture some of the reward pool, target their grant money for those 
needs.247  The size and obviousness of the political reward available overcome 
the differences in preferences, constituencies, and information among the 
various levels of officials such that their spending decisions converge. 
The repeated game adherents also have a good explanation for categorical 
stickiness.[ES: I would delete this last clause unless you want to explain how 
they are weaker and on what fronts.]  In the repeated game stories, federal 
grants stick categorically because otherwise, in the next round, there would not 
be a federal grant, or not as much of one.248  A challenge for these theorists, 
however, is the increasing number of studies showing that flypaper effects 
often have only a limited duration.249  Money may stick to a category for a year 
or two, but by the third year of a grant program the funds are offset according 
to classical theory.250  That result is surprising because, if anything, one would 
expect smaller flypaper effects in the first years of a grant, as it can take time 
to ramp up a large new spending project.251  Perhaps the argument for 
 
245 See Hines & Thaler, supra note 29, at 222. 
246 See Singhal, supra note 104, at 549. 
247 Cf. Knight, supra note 103, at 72 (observing that state officials may help federal 
officials determine how best to allocate grant dollars); Volden, supra note 61, at 226 
(arguing the grant-maker will target grants to subject areas in which there is high public 
demand). 
248 See Baicker, supra note 103, at 152; Singhal, supra note 104, at 259. 
249 Gordon, supra note 103, at 1773. 
250 Gordon, supra note 103, at 1773, 1787-88, 1790-91; Lutz, supra note 103, at 19.  But 
see Singhal, supra note 104, at 562 (finding the flypaper effect persisted in an instance 
where the source of funds was litigation against tobacco company rather than a grant from 
another government entity). 
251 See Lutz, supra note 103, at 19. 
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repeated-gamer theorists is that the attention of Congress or the local coalition 
has wandered; coalitions are notoriously difficult to hold together.252  
However, in these studies Congress is still interested enough, and coalitions 
still active enough, to produce billions of dollars in grants.  It is hard to 
understand why the implicit matching component, or need for rewards, would 
diminish so quickly when the funding itself does not. 
On the other hand, the theory that federal funds are cheaper than state 
dollars, or that the states are otherwise in need of federal money, is also a poor 
fit with short-duration flypaper effects.  It is difficult to imagine that the 
relative efficiency of federal and local tax collection, or the fiscal condition of 
localities, changes dramatically in the span of a few years, no matter how 
successful the grant program. 
Thus, the underinformed or irrational voter and repeated games arguments, 
in combination, fit the available evidence as well or better than the efficiency 
and financial need stories.  When voter misinformation about grants presents 
the opportunity for increased government spending, the spending is sticky by 
category because there is also an implicit matching component or a need to 
reward active constituencies.  At the same time, implicit matching or rewards 
are insufficient by themselves to increase spending in a targeted category, 
because once local voters understand their actual fiscal situation they will 
prefer to return most of the grant money to their own pockets in tax cuts (or to 
reallocate it in other categories).  In the first few years of a grant, especially 
one that is of relatively low salience for voters, voters may not notice or 
understand it, but over time better-informed constituents teach or de-bias 
them.253  Studies of New Hampshire’s court-imposed school financing 
 
252 ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL 57 
(1982); Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1479, 1512-15 (1994). 
253 See Filimon et al., supra note 103, at 52 (considering but rejecting this possibility); 
Lutz, supra note 103, at 24 n.22; Marshall, supra note 238, at 1342 (discussing the role of 
the media in informing voters and constituencies about grants); cf. Baicker, supra note 103, 
at 156 n.15 (noting that some stickiness of categorical spending may result from fact that 
budgets of different agencies are allocated by different committees of the legislature, so that 
legislators do not initially consider budgets of other agencies when setting budget level of 
the agency overseen by their own committee).[ES JH: This parenthetical seems misplaced 
because it doesn’t talk about the understanding of voters] 
 Professor Singhal argues against a “learning story,” pointing to evidence from her own 
work indicating that anti-tobacco spending increased only after states received funds from 
their lawsuits against tobacco companies, rather than during the course of the litigation.  
Singhal, supra note 104, at 559-60.  She suggests that, if increased spending is the result of 
improved voter information, the lawsuit itself should have served that function.  Id.  That 
argument mistakes the point of the “learning” hypothesis.  The theory emphasizes that what 
voters do not understand is the fiscal situation of their government.  There was nothing 
about the tobacco litigation Singhal studied that would have improved voter information on 
that front. 
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realignment, which showed little flypaper effect in localities even from day 
one, support this theory.254  The grants were the dominant political story in the 
state,255 so there was never a window of voter misinformation through which 
“sticky” spending could climb. 
This is not to say that other explanations of the flypaper effect are invalid.  
Indeed, one econometric study showed fairly convincingly that in Mexico, 
where regional per capita income was on the order of a few hundred dollars, 
the flypaper effect likely resulted from local inability to raise money from local 
citizens.256  The taxpayers were simply too poor to pay for their own 
government.  I acknowledge, then, that the true causes of a measured flypaper 
effect may vary widely depending on underlying circumstances. 
As a result, my point is simply that, absent poverty on the scale exhibited in 
some places outside the United States, the existence of a flypaper effect does 
not establish that the states need federal money or prefer to substitute it for 
their own.  Put another way, there is no clear evidence that the states are over-
eager to accept federal dollars.  Nor could courts easily use the presence of a 
flypaper effect as a shorthand method for triggering closer scrutiny.  I am not 
claiming to have irrefutable evidence that the states are not over-eager to 
accept federal dollars.  My argument, however, is that absent some compelling 
showing of a federal interest, state and local governments should be free to 
make agreements with Congress without restriction by federal courts. 
 
 More challenging for my theory is Singhal’s finding that flypaper effects were persistent 
for five years.  Id. at 562.  However, as she notes, the funds at issue in her study derived 
from successful lawsuits against tobacco companies, rather than intergovernmental grants.  
Id. at 563-64.  This difference may well be significant.  Part of what voters may learn over 
time is the fact that the source of the intergovernmental grant includes tax dollars they have 
paid to the grant-making government.  This could make them less inclined to be taxed, in 
effect, twice for the same services: once by the grant-maker, and again by the grant-
recipient.  Since the recipient is smaller, it is politically easier to offset the received grant 
with reduced local taxes than to reduce the grant by the amount of their contribution.  In any 
event, Singhal’s version of the repeated-game story is, like the combination repeated-
game/voter-learning story I tell here, consistent with the view that state and local 
governments are free to decline federal grants. 
254 Lutz, supra note 103, at 3, 25. 
255 Id. at 7-8 (discussing New Hampshire’s unique town hall system, which creates 
involvement on the individual level). 
256 Pablo Camacho-Gutierrez, Essays on Mexican Fiscal Federalism: A Positive Analysis 
145-47 (2005) (unpublished dissertation), available at < 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/etd/d/2005/camachogutierrezp13970/camachogutierrezp13970.pd
f>;  see also DAVID N. KING, FISCAL TIERS: THE ECONOMICS OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNMENT 
114-17 (1984) (noting the possibility that flypaper effects may result from highly 
impoverished local government).  For a discussion of the challenges of decentralized 
revenue-raising in developing economies, see Oates, supra note 101, at 1142-44. 
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D. Indirect Tax Supports for State and Local Government 
Finally, a few words on why it would have been surprising to find evidence 
that local governments are in need of federal assistance.  In particular, I want 
to highlight some unconditional sources of federal support for state and local 
governments generally overlooked in the debate over conditional spending. 
The U.S. Tax Code is the source of many of these forms of unconditional 
support.  Nearly all modern grants from Congress come with at least some 
minor strings attached.257  For example, at a minimum, essentially every 
federal grant comes with the condition that individuals who misdirect those 
funds for personal gain will be subject to federal prosecution.258  In contrast, 
many federal tax provisions provide fiscal support to state and local 
government with few or no conditions. 
Consider, for example, § 501 of the Tax Code, which exempts non-profit 
entities from taxation.259  One explicit rationale for the exemption (and 
accompanying § 170 deductions for contributions to select non-profits) is that 
it encourages production of quasi-governmental services; services that local 
government might otherwise have to provide.260  Non-profit schools, hospitals, 
and other civic associations produce hundreds of billions of local services, and 
there is strong evidence that they would produce less without tax exemption.261 
Several other provisions offer somewhat more targeted subsidies for local 
government activities.  Most prominently, § 164 allows a federal deduction for 
state and local income, property, and (in some cases) sales taxes paid by 
individuals and corporations.262  State and local bonds are exempt from federal 
 
257 See Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 22, at 1918. 
258 See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 603-05 (2004) (deciding on the 
constitutional validity of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (2000), which imposes federal criminal 
penalties on anyone who bribes a government agent, where the government agency has 
received federal benefits greater than $10,000 via a grant or other form of federal 
assistance). 
259 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2000).  Of course, this section does impose some conditions on the 
taxpayer in order to obtain exempt status, but none on the local governments who need not 
duplicate the services offered by the non-profits. 
260 There are also other explanations for the deduction.  For some excellent surveys of 
the field, see Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: 
Thesis, Antithesis, and Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395, 402-26 (1997); Johnny Rex 
Buckles, The Case for the Taxpaying Good Samaritan: Deducting Earmarked Transfers to 
Charity Under Federal Income Tax Law, Theory and Policy, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1243, 
1282-96 (2002); Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 
VA. L. REV. 1393, 1396-1433 (1988). 
261 See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from 
Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 72-75 (1981). 
262 26 U.S.C. § 164 (2000).  For a more detailed discussion of the arguments in favor of 
and against the explanation of § 164 as a subsidy for local governments, see Brian Galle, A 
Republic of the Mind: Cognitive Biases, Fiscal Federalism, and Section 164 of the Tax 
Code, 82 IND. L.J. 673, 680-701 (2007). 
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tax, although there is some debate whether local governments are able to 
capture all of the benefit of the tax advantage attached to the bond.263  The 
low-income housing tax credit offers subsidies for developing or rehabilitating 
homes.264  And lastly, a variety of federal tax subsidies for home ownership 
increase home values, expanding localities’ property tax base.265 
It is not immediately clear whether these subsidies outweigh the other fiscal 
pressures on states.  For example, as I have outlined elsewhere, there is a 
vigorous debate among social scientists over federal deductibility.266  Some 
scholars believe one of the aims of the deduction is to counter-balance the fact 
of interjurisdictional tax competition.267  If local officials know that voters 
need not pay the full cost of the taxes they impose, the officials will not fully 
internalize the political cost of those tax increases, and therefore, in theory, 
raise them higher than they would otherwise.268  But there have been a number 
of writers, including top tax officials in President Reagan’s Treasury 
Department, who argue the deduction actually goes too far in encouraging 
local spending.269  That is, they believe § 164 by itself more than compensates 
 
263 See Brian D. Galle & Ethan Yale, Can Discriminatory State Taxation of Municipal 
Bonds Be Justified?, 117 TAX NOTES 153, 154-55 (2007); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal 
Federalism and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1030, 1044-46 
(1983); Douglas J. Watson & Thomas Vocino, Changing Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relationships: Impact of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on State and Local Governments, 50 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 427, 428-50 (1990). 
264 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2000).  For a review of the LIHTC and its mechanics, see  Andrew 
Zack Blatter & Elena Marty-Nelson, An Overview of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 
17 U. BALT. L. REV. 253, 255-70 (1988); Sagit Leviner, Affordable Housing and the Role of 
the Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program: A Contemporary Assessment, 57 TAX LAW. 
869, 871-75 (2004); U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Development, HOME and Low 
Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/training/web/lihtc/ (last visited Aug. 13, 
2009). 
265 Julie Roin, The Consequences of Undoing the Federal Income Tax, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
319, 331 (2003). 
266 Galle, supra note 262, at 676-81, 685-87. 
267 Bratton & McCahery, supra note 160, at 248 & n.196; see Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal 
Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and 
Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1389, 1410, 1431 (2004); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 
The Uneasy Case for Devolution of the Individual Income Tax, 85 IOWA L. REV. 907, 927-
32 (2000).  Recall that competition among states for mobile capital and high-income 
taxpayers tends to reduce state and local tax levels.  E.g., Oates, supra note 101, at 1121 & 
n.3.  For a more general discussion of central government fiscal counters to the problem of 
local tax competition, see Sam Bucovetsky & Michael Smart, The Efficiency Consequences 
of Local Revenue Equalization: Tax Competition and Distortions, 8 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 
119, 120-22 (2006). 
268 See Michael Smart, Taxation and Deadweight Loss in a System of Intergovernmental 
Transfers, 31 CAN. J. ECON. 189, 206 (1998); Tannenwald, supra note 127, at 4. 
269 2 U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC 
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for any fiscal pressures on state and local government.270  If these 
commentators are correct, then it would be surprising if there were evidence 
that states are over-eager to accept federal money.  State and local government 
may, indeed, already over-produce government services. 
One could argue this point cuts in favor of restrictions on federal grants.271  
Again, competition among states for mobile resources may increase pressure 
on state government to perform more efficiently, or, at a minimum, to hold 
taxes below the level that empire-building officials might prefer.272  If states 
already perceive themselves as fiscally comfortable, and grants add to that 
comfort, then grants may have the effect of dampening what might otherwise 
be welfare-enhancing competition.273  For instance, in the extreme case in 
which all revenue-raising is centralized, there is no interstate tax competition at 
all. 
Even in this extreme case, however, states should still be able to compete.  
States can compete using not only taxes, but also benefits, so that in the 
absence of tax competition one would expect competition for favorable rules 
and efficient services.274  In some instances this shift away from tax 
competition can actually increase overall welfare.275  Nor is it clear that grant 
 
GROWTH 63-64 (1984); Christian Kelders & Marko Kthenbrger, Tax Incentives in Fiscal 
Federalism: An Integrated Perspective 3-4 (Nov. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~ces/Marko/FiscalFederalism.pdf. 
270 I acknowledge, however, that the Treasury offered their views before it was clear for 
how many households the Alternative Minimum Tax would effectively eliminate the § 164 
deduction.  The AMT obliges taxpayers above a certain income threshold to recompute their 
tax without many deductions, including § 164.  26 U.S.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).  
Critically, that threshold is not indexed for inflation, so budget projections now suggest that 
in short order it will be more expensive to repeal the AMT than to repeal the entire rest of 
the individual income tax.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REVENUE & TAX POLICY BRIEF, THE 
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM Tax 1, 8 (2004), 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=5386&sequence=0. 
271 I am grateful to Ilya Somin and Todd Zywicki for raising this argument. 
272 PETERSON, supra note 160, at 17-18, 25-26.  Regarding the effects of tax competition 
on tax rates, see generally Michael Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, Leviathan and Capital 
Tax Competition in Federations, 5 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 177 (2003) (analyzing how tax 
competition both horizontally between states and vertically between various levels of 
government may increase tax rates in a competitive environment). 
273 There is an extensive debate in the public finance literature over whether this 
competition is, on balance, welfare-enhancing.  For summaries of the conflicting views, see 
Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Competition and European Union: Contrasting Perspectives, 31 
REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 133, 133-43 (2001); John Douglas Wilson & David E. 
Wildasin, Capital Tax Competition: Bane or Boon?,  88 J. PUB. ECON. 1065, 1088 (2004); 
George R. Zodrow, Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in the European Union, 10 
INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 651, 651-66 (2003). 
274 See Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental Challenge to 
Federalism, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 205, 224-25 (2001). 
275 See Richard Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Normative 
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levels short of 100% of a state’s funding needs will reduce tax competition.  
Indeed, one might expect tax competition to increase as states become more 
fiscally solid, because the state is better able to afford generous tax breaks for 
its most mobile taxpayers.276  Thus, to the extent that interstate competition 
enhances national welfare, there is little indication that the fiscal effects of 
federal grants and other federal supports reduce that competition.277 
On a final note, the proliferation of relatively unconditional supports for 
local government raises an additional question about the logic of the clear 
statement rule.  If the Constitution obliges the federal government to avoid 
coercing state governments, why does it follow that the solution is restrictions 
on grant conditions?  Why is it not the solution for courts simply to require 
more unconditional financial support for states, to the point that states 
obviously will be free to accept or decline further grants?  It seems clear that 
courts would refuse to consider, as beyond their institutional capacity, claims 
about what level of funding a local government needed in order to meet the 
minimum level of functionality “guaranteed” by Article IV.278  But if claims 
about the coerciveness of grants ultimately turn on the same question, then 
they should similarly be outside a federal court’s proper functions.  While I 
remain somewhat open to the argument that Congress should internalize the 
costs of its own regulatory decisions, the “coercion” and cost-exporting 
arguments for judicially constraining conditional spending seem untenable. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, my analysis here suggests there is little justification for the clear 
statement rule.  The rule, like other forms of constitutional enforcement, 
displaces the expressed preferences of political actors, including both federal 
 
Critique, in THE NEW FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED? 97, 104-05 (John 
Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1997) (arguing that the existence of tax competition 
may induce states to set superoptimal levels for other regulation, in order to avoid drawing 
in capital in excess of local infrastructural capacity). 
276 Moreover, although I have for the most part here assumed that federal grants will be 
offered in the worst possible form, in reality Congress has a number of incentives to 
cultivate competition among states.  Competition enables Congress to gather experimental 
data about alternative approaches which it can then appropriate for use in national 
legislation, as well as to diversify the risks of such experiments.  And, of course, if 
competition in fact increases national welfare, and officials are judged on the performance 
of the economy, congresspersons have at least some reason to be interested in the welfare 
effects of grants. 
277 On the other hand, it is possible the architecture of some fiscal supports may reduce 
competition by undermining the exit or participation incentives of local taxpayers.  See 
Galle, supra note 262, at 696-701.  But that is a question of program design, not one about 
the merits of grants generally. 
278 U.S. CONST. art. IV.  Cf. Stewart, supra note 22, at 930-31 (mentioning that courts 
have traditionally left claims about proper or just allocation of societal resources to political 
process). 
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grant-offerors and state and local grant-acceptors.  Any analysis of the clear 
statement rule, including Professor Tribe’s political-process story, must 
account for that fact by pointing to some flaw in the decisions officials make in 
offering and accepting grants that might justify federal judicial intervention.  
Yet there is no real evidence that state decisions to accept funds fail to preserve 
the values that federalism protects, even if that is not what in fact motivates the 
state officials.  Officials have their own reasons for preserving diversity.  The 
perceived discount on raising funds locally often counter-balances the costs of 
accepting federal money.  And there is little evidence that state officials 
perceive difficulty in raising funds through their own tax systems, especially in 
light of other federal tax supports, such as the federal deductibility of many 
state and local taxes. 
Of course, the reader may wonder whether any of this matters at all.  After 
all, we might think of the clear statement rule as just a sort of default rule.  
Perhaps if Congress views it as an unwise rule, Congress might simply enact 
conditional spending statutes with a disclaimer providing that all the provisions 
of the statute are to be interpreted purposively, or that some rules may be 
binding on states even if not expressly stated in the text of the statute.  That, of 
course, assumes that the costs of overcoming legislative inertia are relatively 
low.279  Additionally, even if Congress acted, it is not clear that the Supreme 
Court would let stand efforts to displace the clear statement rule.  If the Court 
views the clear statement rule as a form of constitutional enforcement, or as 
necessary to protect its own institutional prerogatives, the Court is unlikely to 
give it up easily.  For instance, some commentators believe Congress can 
displace the Gregory clear statement rule only one statute at a time.280  Well, 
what is a “statute?”  The Court could demand an enormous amount of 
specificity for provisions supposedly setting aside the clear statement rule: a 
super-clear statement rule.281  It is a safe bet that, absent some reconsideration 
by the Supreme Court, the issue of the clear statement rule is here for a long 
stay. 
 
279 See Ferejohn & Friedman, supra note 65, at 855-58 (arguing that many supposed 
default rules may simply become legislative rules, due to difficulty in mobilizing Congress 
and other actors to displace them). 
280 E.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2097 (2002). 
281 For a more extensive discussion of this point, see Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, 
Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of 
Federal Power, 58 DUKE L.J. 1933, 2005 (2008). 
